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                                                               Abstract 
       Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, America’s image abroad plunged, 
especially in the Arab world, where anti-Americanism has been on the rise. America’s 
hard power alone can no longer efficiently boost America’s reputation and the U.S. 
government has abandoned its soft power resources. Although important, the linchpin of 
public diplomacy, known as cultural diplomacy, I argue has become a neglected 
diplomatic tool in U.S.-Middle East relations. Accordingly, this thesis will explore the 
role of dance in cultural diplomacy as a catalyst of releasing tension and bringing peace 
among nation-states, especially in U.S.-Egypt relations. After the calamities of the 
Egyptian Revolution in 2011, the role of Egypt as a valuable U.S. ally in the Arab world 
has brought uncertainty among U.S. foreign policy makers, mainly because of its Muslim 
Brotherhood-nurtured Egyptian president. The U.S. Department of State should revisit its 
soft power strategies such as its successful cultural exchange programs during the Cold 
War, and apply them to its current U.S.-Egypt relations. 
       In order to test my hypothesis, I will elucidate the importance of Raqs Sharqi as an 
effective diplomatic tool of cultural diplomacy in U.S.-Egypt relations. Hence, special 
attention will be given to the critical assessment of several case studies during the Cold 
War, in particular, the role of American dancers as cultural diplomats, who successfully 
broke down ideological and cultural barriers in political hot spots with growing anti-
Americanism. The conclusion offers recommendations that serve as a prescription to 
reduce anti-American attitudes. Although Raqs Sharqi in cultural diplomacy is not a 
panacea to U.S.-Middle East relations, I argue it is an important feature of soft power.  
Key words: cultural diplomacy, international relations, soft power, Raqs Sharqi, dance. 
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                                                                CHAPTER I  
                                                          INTRODUCTION 
       After the political turmoil of 9/11 in 2001, followed by an anti-Muslim stigma in the 
U.S., including the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, an increased understanding of 
American and Muslim culture is imperative to improve diplomatic relations between the 
U.S. and the Middle East. To illustrate, recent presidential elections in Egypt and the 
attacks on the U.S. embassy in both Egypt and Libya in 2012 have required strenuous 
diplomatic relations between the U.S. and these two countries. Accordingly, as Egypt has 
chosen a Muslim Brotherhood-nurtured president, Mohammed Morsi, the U.S. 
government has been concerned with what the new Egyptian president will bring to U.S.-
Egyptian diplomatic relations. What’s more, Nathan Brown argues that the U.S.-Egypt 
relationship does not need a divorce; instead, it needs therapy.2 Ironically, since the U.S. 
government has always shown an obsession with the Middle East, especially, now with 
the recent Egyptian President, Mohammed Morsi, it might be beneficial to the U.S. 
government to reapply some of its previous strategies of utilizing soft power strategies 
during the Cold War. That is to say, in today’s strenuous relations between the U.S. and 
the Middle East, where traditional diplomacy or military strategies may not be the best 
solution for fruitful diplomatic relations, there is a necessity for cultural dialogue and 
exchange of cultural ideas between the West and the Middle East to deliver an effective 
message of mutual understanding.  
       Likewise, Cynthia Schneider, a cultural diplomacy expert at the Washington’s Saban !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!Nathan Brown, “The U.S.-Egypt Relationship Needs Therapy, Not a Divorce,” The 
New Republic, September 13, 2012, http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/107241/the-us-egypt-relationship-
needs-therapy-not-divorce (accessed on January 21, 2013). !
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Center for Middle East Policy, hopes that Washington policymakers take the opportunity 
of implementing soft power through cultural diplomacy to increase cross-cultural 
awareness through the arts and culture, which can change the current U.S. relationship to 
the Middle East, “If [people are] open to it, arts and culture can increase understanding.”3 
Because of these reasons, it is important to mention that this thesis does not imply that 
soft power is the only solution to stronger diplomatic relations with Egypt or that it is a 
panacea to U.S.-Egyptian relations. This addresses the need for softening the traditional 
U.S. approach of hard power through the spectrum of cultural diplomacy, and specifically 
in U.S.-Egypt relations, because cultural exchange is necessary, even though it is a 
neglected diplomatic tool, especially, in U.S.–Middle East relations. Cultural diplomacy 
is important because it serves as a buffer zone between nation-states with fragile or weak 
diplomatic relations, and it helps create a mutual cultural understanding that is imperative 
in building fruitful U.S.-Middle East relations. 
HYPOTHESIS 
My hypothesis is that pursuing cultural diplomacy in other contexts, such as U.S.-Soviet 
relations has been productive in bringing conformity between nation-states, and reducing 
tension between states; particularly, through dance. Therefore, in U.S.-Egypt relations 
through an Egyptian folk dance, known in Arabic as Raqs Sharqi, might be as effective as 
a hegemonic hard power approach. I will attempt to support my hypothesis by examining 
the cases of dance in improving diplomatic relations to identify the effectiveness of each 
case common to cultural diplomacy. Then, using former U.S. President, Eisenhower’s 
Emergency Fund for International Affairs that supported the nation’s first cultural export !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Marisa Mazria-Katz, “Middle Eastern Cultural Diplomacy.” March 7, 2009, The Financial Times, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7a8618ea-091d-11de-b8b0-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2CoYddg36 (accessed 
on January 31, 2013). 
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program of dance, I will identify the processes by which dance was formed. Emphasis 
will be placed on U.S. state interest and the role of American dancers, who served as 
cultural diplomats during the Cold War. Cultural diplomacy through dance is important 
because dance is a universal language through which people express their cultures to 
counteract isolationism, misunderstanding, hatred, gaffes, and missteps. Most 
importantly, dance brings understanding, respect, and peace between states.  
METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will use a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods. As far as 
quantitative methods, I will use statistical data and economic figures, related to the 
funding for cultural exchange activities and U.S. aid foreign budgets, drawn from the 
U.S. Department of State, the Egyptian Ministry of Cultural Affairs, cultural institutions, 
agencies, and dance organizations. For qualitative methods, I will use five case studies of 
cultural diplomacy in U.S.-Soviet relations (The Jose Limón Dance Company, Martha 
Graham’s Dance Company, Alvin Ailey’s Dance Company, Igor Moiseyev’s Dance 
Company, The Robert Joffrey Ballet, The Porgy and Bess, American jazz musicians’ 
tour, the Mahmoud Reda Troupe, and the El-Nil [The Nile] Folkloric Troupe), drawn 
from books, journals, articles, and reports, outlining each case’s history and methods. I 
will look at how nation-states have dealt with them at various points of history, in order 
to validate the premise that cultural diplomacy is an important diplomatic tool nowadays. 
In order to evaluate the benefits of Raqs Sharqi in cultural diplomacy, I interviewed both 
American and Egyptian dance experts who perform and teach Raqs Sharqi. This Egyptian 
folk dance dates back to thousands of years ago and celebrates the joy and happiness of 
life. After I look at the case studies, I will apply Raqs Sharqi to cultural diplomacy in 
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today’s U.S.-Egypt relations to see how this Egyptian folk dance can be used in cultural 
diplomacy to foster cultural understanding in U.S.-Egypt relations.  
        As a result, it is important to address the following questions: how is soft power 
different than hard power? Does the U.S. government view cultural diplomacy as an 
important part of its diplomatic efforts, and if not, what are the underlying reasons for 
this? Will cultural diplomacy play a significant role in U.S. foreign policy? How can the 
U.S. Department of State benefit from using soft power effectively through cultural 
exchange to improve its relations with Egypt? Why mostly hegemonic dance forms like 
ballet or similar Western dance forms, instead of Raqs Sharqi have been sponsored by the 
U.S. Department of State, therefore, included in cultural diplomacy? What is Raqs 
Sharqi? What is its historical and social background? How does Raqs Sharqi fit into the 
trajectory of cultural diplomacy? How is Raqs Sharqi used by dancers both in the U.S. 
and Egypt? How American dancers, who both have taught and performed Raqs Sharqi in 
Egypt, were perceived by the Egyptian people? What sort of impact has Raqs Sharqi had 
on the Egyptian people? Will the U.S. Department of State ever send American dance 
artists, who perform and teach Raqs Sharqi, to serve as cultural diplomats in the Middle 
East and North Africa? Will the U.S. Department of State ever invite Egyptian dance 
artists to the United States? As a cultural attraction will Raqs Sharqi be able to increase 
mutual understanding between the U.S. and Egypt? What will happen to American soft 
power? Will cultural diplomacy play a significant role in U.S.-Egypt relations or in U.S.-
Middle East relations? Is the U.S. Department of State’s present investment in cultural 
relations of the Middle East and North Africa sufficient? How can we assure that the best 
of U.S. culture is exported to the Middle East and North Africa, particularly to Egypt, and 
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also encourage reciprocity, making Egyptian culture more accessible to Americans? 
These questions and more will be explored.  
       No one has the final word on the contested concept of Raqs Sharqi in cultural 
diplomacy, but because it is an important, yet, neglected diplomatic tool in U.S.-Middle 
East relations, I hope to introduce more clarity into the discussion and a larger 
perspective into strategic visions.  
       The following chapter of this thesis will present the review of literature, followed by 
chapter three that will address the following: first, the concept of power, and the 
theoretical framework of soft power versus hard power in order to highlight the 
importance of cultural diplomacy; second, the decline of U.S. soft power, and finally the 
changing context of power in the field of international relations, and why soft power has 
become more important than before. The fourth chapter will introduce the historical 
background of cultural diplomacy in international affairs, specifically, the benefits and 
necessity of culture diplomacy for the purpose of promoting America’s positive image in 
the Middle East and North Africa. Chapter five gives attention to both the social and 
historical background of Egypt, including U.S.-Egyptian relations. Chapter six introduces 
the history of the Egyptian folk dance, known in Egyptian Arabic as Raqs Sharqi, and 
some of the obstacles to Raqs Sharqi as a soft power approach in Egypt today, such as the 
religious fundamentalists and the conservative urban elites. The next chapter will consist 
of discussion and analysis of several case studies where cultural diplomacy, initiated by 
the U.S. Department of State, have been successful during the Cold War as, special 
attention will be given to dance artists, being sent overseas to serve as cultural diplomats, 
and how applying Raqs Sharqi to cultural diplomacy might be as productive as ballet in 
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cultural diplomacy during the Cold War. The last section will include concluding remarks 
such as implications and policy recommendations to the U.S. Department of State, for the 
necessity of Raqs Sharqi in cultural diplomacy in improving U.S.-Egypt relations. 
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                                                            CHAPTER II 
                                                  LITERATURE REVIEW  
      Recent U.S. government approaches towards the Middle East, North Africa, and 
Central Asia such as hard power have not only been exhaustive and expensive, but have 
also faced serious challenges; for example, deployment of U.S. troops to Afghanistan in 
2001, U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and recent NATO bombings of Libya, where hard 
power has been used, have stirred unfavorable views of the United States around the 
world. Furthermore, the use of military force can cause a negative impression. To 
illustrate, according to recent opinion polls about the United States conducted by the Pew 
Research Center, negative views of U.S. politics outnumber positive views in Western 
countries like France, Germany, Britain, Italy, and Spain; what’s more, starting in 2003 
negative opinions of the U.S. have increased in the entire Middle East, including Egypt 
where positive views of the U.S. have decreased from 61% to 15% and 71% to 38%.4  
      While completely wrong, nevertheless, according to another poll, in 2003 many 
Germans believed that the Bush administration might have set up the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001.5 Therefore, according to Joseph Nye, America’s negative image 
abroad has been increasing, which has formed a perception of the United States as “a 
classically imperialistic power.”6 What’s more, an Australian observer, Paul Kelly,  
points out that the outcomes of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 clearly indicate 
declining U.S. soft power, which has enabled the rise of anti-Americanism, an increase of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Cynthia Schneider, “Culture Communicates: U.S. Diplomacy That Works,” 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael,’ no. 94 (2004): 17. 
5 “Poll: One-Third of Germans Believe U.S. May Have Staged Sept 11 Attacks,” 
Reuters, July 23, 2003, accessed October 8, 2012, http://soc.culture.german.narkive.com/8sVQc6hs/one-
third-of-germans-believe-bush-was-behind-9-11-attacks 
6 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 2 (2004): 
255.!
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terrorism, and most importantly, high U.S. military expenses in the recent war of Iraq and 
its rebuilding efforts.7 Paul Kelly reiterates that the consequences for America’s negative 
image abroad are a product of the Bush administration’s failure to gain U.N. 
authorization for the U.S. invasion of Iraq n 2003.8  
      In another instance, a Eurobarometer poll indicates that most Europeans consider the 
U.S. “to play a negative role in fighting global poverty, protecting the environment, and 
maintaining peace in the world.”9 Joseph Nye also explains that negative views towards 
America are highest among the younger generation.10 Furthermore, as U.S. pop culture 
might be still popular among young people overseas, “the unfavorable views of U.S. 
foreign policy towards the Middle East and North Africa stir uncertainty about U.S. 
power,” which shows that U.S. soft power is in decline.11 
      Nye’s definition of soft power is “the ability to affect others through the co-optive 
means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to 
obtain preferred outcomes.”12 Moreover, Nye clarifies that because soft power is the 
ability to attract positive perceptions, its resources are the key to producing attraction, 
which often brings conformity between nation-states.13 In terms of attraction between 
states, Nye distinguishes two models of soft power: a direct model that includes such 
power resources as government elites, and an indirect model that includes publics. A 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Paul Kelly, “Power Pact,” The Australian, July 26, 2003, quoted in Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and 
American Foreign Policy.” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 2 (2004): 255. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” 255. 
10 Ibid., 256. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Joseph Nye, “What is Power in Global Affairs?” in The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 
2011): 50. 
13 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and Leadership,” Compass: A Journal of Leadership, (2004): 13, 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/talks/docs/11_06_06_seminar_Nye_HP_SP_Leadership.pdf 
(accessed February 14, 2013).!
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direct model is when political leaders are attracted by the charisma and expertise of other 
leaders such as the ability of President Obama to convince powerful states to increase 
their donations at a G-20 meeting.14 An indirect mode of soft power is when power 
creates an amicable platform for discussions, where “publics and third parties are 
influenced, and they in turn affect the leaders of other countries.”15 For example, 
according to Nye, The Turkish government did not authorize the American Fourth 
Infantry Division to pass through Turkey during the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. 16 In 
another instance, Mexican President, Vicente Fox, failed to accommodate the Bush 
administration by backing up its second U.N. resolution authorizing U.S. invasion of Iraq 
because Mexican public opinion disapproved it.17 To sum up, Nye argues that public 
polls are not irrelevant when an element of soft power because they “act as a constraint 
on authoritarian leaders, and in many authoritarian states where internal dissent is muted, 
international opprobrium has an effect.18 
      Equally important, Joseph Nye argues that the costs of ignoring soft power are high, 
because the United States pays a price. To illustrate, in Soft Power and American Foreign 
Policy, Nye explains that U.S. foreign policies can only be seen as legitimate in the view 
of others, when U.S. “soft power is enhanced.”19 Accordingly, Nye explains that the 
attractiveness of a country’s policies can be used to cooperate in critical moments, such 
the recent trend of terrorism, which has become a threat to Americans.20 It is important to 
note that Nye emphasizes the need for cooperation from other states when dealing with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power,” in The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011): 94. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 96. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 94. 
19 Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” 257.!
20 Ibid. 
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terrorism because the United States is not capable of fighting terrorism alone; however, 
cooperation requires the use of soft power.21 Nye gives an example of Germany’s 
disapproval of the U.S. rationale for the invasion of Iraq; that is to say, Iraq being blamed 
for possessing weapons of mass destruction, and being linked to Al Qaeda. Furthermore, 
Nye indicates that the U.S. will only overcome the threat of Islamist terrorism, “if 
moderate Muslims win, and the ability to attract the moderates is critical to victory.”22 
      On the other hand, in Soft Power: Power of Attraction or Confusion, Ying Fan argues 
that soft power is not a power of attraction but “confusion” because it is not only difficult 
to measure, but also time consuming as it “takes longer to produce the desired 
outcomes.”23 What’s more, Fan shows that soft power has the ability to persuade through 
attraction but on a personal or individual level as opposed to a national level, wherein 
there are various actors that may or not like the attraction.24 Unlike Fan, Joseph Nye 
presents the advantages of soft power as other than the threat or use of force to persuade 
the adversary as in the “sticks and carrots” approach, which is essential for hard power; 
therefore, excluding the following hard power approaches: coercive diplomacy, war, 
alliance, aid, bribes, and sanctions. 25 Similarly to Fan’s argument about the limits of soft 
power not being a power of attraction, Nye explains that the reason some people are 
skeptical about the trajectory of soft power. In other words, because in their eyes, power 
is perceived only as “deliberate acts of command and control” that exclude power as “the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 258. 
23 Ying Fan, “Soft Power: Power of attraction or confusion?” Place Branding and   
Public Diplomacy, 4 (2008): 6-7. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Joseph Nye, “The Changing Nature of Power,” in The Means to Success in World 
Politics, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 31.!
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ability to get the outcomes you want without having to force people to change their 
behavior through threats or payments.”26  
      Although hard power is beyond the scope of this thesis, Joseph Nye mentions that 
without denying the need for hard power, a new concept of power has emerged in the 
lexicon of international relations, known as smart power; in other words, a blend of soft 
with hard power that provides balance of power.27 Nye even clarifies that smart power “is 
not about maximizing power or preserving hegemony; above all, it is about “combining 
resources into successful strategies in the new context of power diffusion and ‘the rise of 
the rest.’”28 Nye explains that President Obama and Secretary Clinton’s policies have 
adopted the concept of smart power. He also gives past examples of Otto von Bismarck’s 
Prussia defeating Denmark, Austria and France, and even Japan’s diplomatic policy 
toward Britain and the U.S. in order “to make itself attractive overseas.”29 Similarly, in 
The Future of Power, Nye gives another example of China when the Mao regime used a 
blend of soft with hard power to attract allies abroad.30  
       It is important to note that according to Joseph Nye, one of the country’s soft power 
basic resources is its culture, and “in some contexts culture can be an important power 
resource.”31 In The Interpretation of Cultures, Clifford Geertz elucidates culture as “a 
system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men 
communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Ibid., 15. 
27 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and Higher Education,” Forum for the Future of Higher Education, 
http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/ffp0502s.pdf (accessed November 23, 2012). 
28 Joseph Nye, “Smart Power,” in The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011): 207-208. 
29 Ibid., 210-211. 
30 Ibid., 211. 
31 Ibid., 84.!
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that has been transmitted throughout history.32 Nye explains that more research is 
necessary on the relationship of culture and power behavior. He even questions the 
possibility of Western cultural attraction to diminish recent extremist trends in Muslim 
societies around the world. 33 Furthermore, Nye explains that some think such a 
possibility is unrealistic. However, he gives the Islamic state of Iran as an example, 
where “Western music and videos are anathema to the ruling mullahs, but attractive to 
many of the younger generation.”34 Equally important, Nye emphasizes that cultural 
contacts have been beneficial to the United States. For instance, Chinese students 
experience U.S. culture while pursuing their studies in American universities, and this 
helps Chinese citizens discover the democratic and free enterprise potential for Chinese 
development. He explains that “over time cultures influence each other.”35 In another 
instance, Joseph Nye elaborates on how the American University of Beirut not only 
“enhanced American soft power in Lebanon, but “it later enhanced Lebanon’s soft power 
in America.36 
       In How Soft Power Works, Alexander Vuving explains that soft power can be 
extracted from the media, the arts, peacekeeping, economic aid, visits exchange 
programs, teaching a nation’s language, and promoting the studies of other cultures and 
languages.37 Cynthia Schneider describes that the exchange of cultural ideas, art, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), quoted in The Future of 
Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011): 255. 
33 Nye, “Smart Power,” in The Future of Power, 84. 
34 Ibid., 85. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Alexander L. Vuving, “How Soft Power Works.” Paper presented at American Political Association 
annual meeting for the panel “Soft Power and Smart Power,”     
Toronto, Canada, September 3, 2009, 13, 
http://apcss.org/Publications/Vuving%20How%20soft%20power%20works%20APSA%202009.pdf 
(accessed February 19, 2013). 
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thoughts, beliefs, information, values, systems and other features of culture, necessary to 
foster mutual understanding are known in the trajectory of international relations as 
cultural diplomacy, which is “a prime example of soft power.”38 According to Marta 
Osojnik, the author of Cultural Diplomacy and the European Union: Key Characters and 
Historical Development, cultural diplomacy “has existed since the beginning of 
civilization, in one form or another, under one name or another.”39Accordingly, a 2005 
Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy at the U.S. Department of 
State shows the first example of U.S. cultural diplomacy to be as early as World War I. 40  
Most importantly, in 1938, the U.S. government began “to support exchange programs 
for students and artists under the 1936 Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American 
Cultural Relations,” which later served as a model to another critical for U.S.-Soviet 
relations series of strong cultural diplomacy efforts during the Cold War.41  
     In Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in World War II: The Art of Making Friends, 
Darlene J. Sadlier discusses the importance of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs (CIAA), “whose main objective was to strengthen cultural and 
commercial relations between the U.S. and Latin America” to counteract the face of Nazi 
Germany’s cultural activities in the latter.42 What’s more, Sadlier reiterates that the CIAA 
created a platform for numerous “artists, filmmakers and writers, who perhaps for the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Schneider, Culture Communicates, 1-2. 
39 Marta Osojnik, “Cultural Diplomacy and the European Union: Key Characters and Historical 
Development,” Institute for Cultural Diplomacy (2011): 1, http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/pdf/case-
studies/cd-eu.pdf (accessed February 19, 2013). 
40 “Cultural Diplomacy-the Linchpin of Public Diplomacy: Report of the Advisory        
Committee on Cultural Diplomacy.” U.S. Department of State, September 2005, 7, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/54374.pdf (accessed February 19, 2013). 
41 Ibid. 
42 Darlene J. Sadlier, “Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in World War II: The Art of Making Friends,” 
Institute for Cultural Diplomacy (2011), 
http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/pdf/participant-papers/2012-03-cdp/Good-Neighbor-
Cultural-Diplomacy-in-World-War-II-The-Art-of-Making-Friends--Dr-Darlene-J-Sadlier.pdf (accessed 
February 19, 2013). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Torkom Movsesiyan 
! *(!
first time, felt that culture was a recognizable and integral part of U.S. foreign 
diplomacy.”43 Yet, Sadlier emphasizes that the Cold War ended the CIAA, “an agency 
that achieved what no other agency then or now had in terms of U.S.-Latin American 
relations.”44  
      In Soft Power and Higher Education, Joseph Nye points at the Cold War as the 
strongest example of U.S. cultural diplomacy during the U.S. government’s battle against 
the former Soviet Union included a blend of hard and soft power, described earlier as 
smart power. Furthermore, he explains that what helped promote American soft power 
during that period were both cultural and academic exchanges between the United States 
and the former Soviet Union in the 1950s.45 In 1958, Columbia University political 
scientist, David Truman, influenced Aleksandr Yakovlev’s studies, who later became the 
head of the Politburo, and managed to influence important Soviet Union political figures 
like Mikhail Gorbachov. In addition, many soft power strategies followed, including that 
of the increased number of Soviet Union students, visiting the United States during 
exchange programs.46  
       Accordingly, in Dance for Export: Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War, Naima 
Prevots focuses on the Cold War period when former President Eisenhower’s cultural 
diplomacy program sent American dance artists to the Soviet Union to dispel the notion 
of Americans as nothing but “boorish, uncultured, superficial, and materialistic.”47 In 
addition, American dance artists like Martha Graham, Alvin Ailey, and Jose Limón, 
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served as cultural diplomats in host countries, including those of the Middle East, and 
“broke down barriers between cultures and ideologies.”48 Above all, Prevots discusses 
how the intersection between dance and diplomacy made significant contribution to 
ameliorating U.S.-Soviet diplomatic relations. Yet, she emphasizes that despite the 
contribution of dance in cultural diplomacy during the Cold War very little credit, if any, 
has been given to dance and dance artists, who served as cultural ambassadors in U.S.-
Soviet cultural exchange programs.49  
      For these reasons, Prevots also points out that during the Cold War the U.S. 
government invited Soviet ballet artists, such as Igor Moiseyev to help both the U.S. and 
the Soviet government “create an atmosphere that will enable the United States and 
Russia to live in peace.”50 Hence, Prevots finalizes the outcomes of Moiseyev’s ballet 
performances all over the U.S., not only contributed to “international relations, but also to 
artistic exchange.”51 To reiterate, Prevots provides an example of one U.S. representative 
during the Cold War, who mentioned that through music and dance, American dancers 
who were sent overseas “have done more towards establishing a close rapport between 
our countries than a staff of attachés could hope to do in years.”52 
      Accordingly, Prevots reports that in 1955 in Cairo, Egypt, the U.S. cast of Porgy and 
Bess, sponsored by the U.S. Department of State, “received Egyptian President Nasser’s 
personal expression of appreciation, including a journalist’s statement, “If this is 
propaganda, let us have more of it.”53 In like manner, Prevots elucidates the success of 
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Martha Graham’s touring company in politically hot spots like the Soviet Union, 
Pakistan, India, and Indonesia, a country with a significant Muslim population, whose 
government was anti-American.54 On the whole, Prevots illustrates the impact of Porgy 
and Bess on Israel with an example,  
       In Tel Aviv—at Ambassador Lawson’s reception for the Company—the Russian    
       Ambassador said, with gleaming face to Mrs. Ira Gershwin, “Oh—if only WE had a    
      PORGY AND BESS—WE—would—send—it!” and then he wound up with an “on!”  
      and a global gesture. It is impossible to transmit on paper the knowing intent of his           
      gesture.55 
      In Choreographic Politics, Anthony Shay examines the successes and challenges of 
Egyptian folkloric troupes, designed to preserve Egyptian heritage through various forms 
of Egyptian dance. According to Shay, the El-Nil Folkloric Troupe is “the most 
significant and well-received group outside of Egypt, but its existence in Cairo goes 
almost unnoticed.”56 An Egyptian dance scholar, Magda Saleh, explains that unlike the 
success of the El-Nil Folkloric Troupe overseas, the same dance troupe is not received 
well in Egypt because “native arts do not have any cultural cachet, and are regarded as 
primitive and non-aesthetic,” unlike “theatricalized versions,” which are “considered a 
substantial improvement.”57 Although native arts are not as welcomed in Egypt as they 
are in the West, Shay mentions that the dance troupe toured successfully the U.S. several 
times, and were invited by the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. in 1975. 58         
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Ibid., 45. 
55 Ibid.,29. 
56 Anthony Shay, “Egypt Bazaar of Dance,” in Choreographic Politics: State Folk Dance Ensembles, 
Representation and Power (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 2002): 159. 
57 Quoted in “Egypt Bazaar of Dance,” 159. 
58 Shay, “Egypt Bazaar of Dance,” 158. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Torkom Movsesiyan 
! "*!
     Also, according to Shay, initially the Egyptian government expressed an interest in 
sending the famous Reda Troupe, led by a native Egyptian, named Mahmoud Reda, to 
perform at the Smithsonian Institution. Yet, “the folklorists of the Smithsonian 
Institution” refused to do so because unlike the El-Nil Folkloric Troupe, the Reda Troupe 
“manifested a patently nontraditional representation of Egypt.”59 According to Marjorie 
Franken, the Reda Troupe performances impacted the creation of folkloric troupes in 
other Arabic countries, such as “Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other Arabic-
speaking countries.”60 Finally, Shay notes that in another Egyptian dance troupe, known 
as the El-Tannoura Egyptian Heritage Folkloric Troupe, “the tannoura (skirt) dancer 
brought audiences through America to its feet.”61 
       In the same way, Shay describes another form of Egyptian folk dance, known in 
Egyptian Arabic as raqs sharqi, that has gained popularity in the last century, and it is 
also known in the West under the term, belly dance.62 According to Magda Saleh’s 
documentary, Egypt Dances, Raqs Sharqi is a unisex folk dance that can be seen in many 
of the regions in Egypt.63 According to Shay, teaching and performing raqs sharqi in 
Egypt along with other Egyptian dance forms like tahtib, and the Ghawazi “has greatly 
subsided since Islamist resurgence in Egypt, and dance activity is much less than it 
was.”64 On the contrary, Shay argues that it is not Islamic law and attitude, but rather 
colonialism, both Ottoman and British that resulted in “the negative attitude toward 
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dance, including choreophobic attitudes that Egyptians [and other Middle Easterners] 
hold concerning dancing and its place in Egyptian life and on Egyptian stages.”65 
Therefore, a Middle East studies scholar, Timothy Mitchell, clarifies that “the reason for 
colonialism was “to create both a material order and a conceptual moral order.”66 On the 
whole, Shay quotes former Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, who states, “Recent riots 
in the Imbaba district of Cairo were instigated not by radical Islamists but by indecent 
and troublesome elements of the local district,” who happen to be belly dancers and 
drummers “from the slums.”67 
      Although the practice of cultural diplomacy has been demonstrated here as highly 
desirable in Culture Communicates: U.S. Diplomacy that Works, Cynthia Schneider 
examines the reasons behind the decline of U.S. cultural diplomacy starting in the 1990s 
to present. She points out that with the end of the Cold War, cultural exchange programs 
faced severe cutbacks, when the host of cultural diplomacy, the United States Information 
Agency (USIA), was integrated into the U.S. Department of State.68 Furthermore, Juliet 
Antunes Sablosky reports that “since 1993, budgets have fallen by nearly 30%, staff has 
been cut by about 30% overseas and 20% in the U.S., and dozens of cultural centers, 
libraries and branch posts have been closed.”69 To illustrate, “between 1995 and 2001 the 
number of exchange participants in The Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs 
(BECA) programs fell from about 45, 000 to 29, 000.”70  
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        In like manner, Schneider explains that the lack of institutional support for cultural 
diplomacy to be “capricious and sporadic reflecting the interests of individual 
ambassadors,” who are the epicenter of exchange of cultural ideas among nations. 71 
Accordingly, the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy indicates that when a war is 
over, the promotion of cultural activities is suspended because of America’s “traditional 
lack of public support for the arts.”72 In Culture Communicates: U.S. Diplomacy that 
Works, Schneider concludes that the above cutbacks in the U.S. cultural diplomacy 
budget “reflected a profound misunderstanding of diplomacy in the post Cold War 
world,” where the U.S. closed down its libraries and America Houses overseas and 
“replaced by information resource centers.”73 In like manner, Samer Shehata, a 
distinguished Georgetown University Assistant Professor and specialist in Arab Studies, 
explained that the American Cultural Center in Alexandria [Egypt] was where she 
learned about Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln.74 
        The Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy recommends for the U.S. State 
Department to include more “cultural exchange programs, inviting more Arab and 
Muslim artists, performers, and writers to the United States, and sending their American 
counterparts to the Islamic world.”75 Similarly, Cynthia Schneider clarifies that “while 
security risks prohibit American writers and artists from visiting Iraq at present, Iraqi 
writers and artists could be invited to the U.S. and other western countries for frank 
exchanges modeled after those in the 1950s.”76 However, the Report of the Advisory 
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Committee on Cultural Diplomacy explains that “tightening visa restrictions since the 
events of 9/11 threatens our most successful, albeit underrated, exchange program—
access to higher education and exposure to America.”77  
       In Hard Power Trumps Soft in U.S. Policy Towards Egypt, Cynthia Schneider 
criticizes the U.S. government for failing to use its soft power over hard power, as 
recently stated by both U.S. President Obama and former Secretary of State, Hillary 
Clinton, during the Egyptian Revolution in the Tahrir Square of Cairo, Egypt. Moreover, 
a cultural diplomacy expert, Cynthia Schneider, explains that “the United States appears 
to be choosing the short term ‘hard power’ and security of the ‘stability’ provided by the 
[the Supreme Council of armed Forces] SCAF over the long term interests of dignity, 
justice, democracy, and human rights for the Egyptian people.”78 Furthermore, Schneider 
illustrates an example with a female Egyptian Presidential candidate, Bothaina Kamel, 
who refused to accept an award, hosted by the U.S. Department of State in 2011, as she 
expressed her disapproval of the U.S. government by indicating that “she cannot accept 
an award stained with blood of the martyrs.”79 In other words, Schneider argues that the 
U.S. provided Egypt with its usual military aid that was used against the Egyptian people 
by the Egyptian government. What’s more, through this example, Schneider implies that 
the U.S. government “participated, even if indirectly in the crackdown on the revolution, 
importing weapons that were used on Egyptian protesters.”80 To sum up, Schneider 
reports that: 
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      There is still time, indeed a precious opportunity, to redeem the promise of the   
      president's and secretary's words. But without action, they will remain just words, and  
      Egyptian people will continue to associate the United States with the weapons  
      pouring down on them.81 
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                                                             CHAPTER III 
                                                           SOFT POWER 
 
                                                                  Power 
      The definition of power varies according to the nature of power; for example, power 
is both the process of influencing outcomes and national attributes or capabilities. In 
other words, power is the ability to influence someone’s behavior. Equally important, 
power is the ability “to affect the opportunities available to others and their willingness to 
choose particular courses of action.”82 According to some, power is like money because it 
can be both “saved and spent,” which similarly to money is fungible. 83 It is important to 
note that here fungibility implies that power’s attributes are useful not only in one area, 
but also in another; specifically, power can be as interchangeable as money. However, 
according to Nye, power is attributes are not as fungible as money because what might 
win in one scenario may not win in another one. 84 To illustrate, Nye uses two past case 
studies, where America’s resources were mightier than those of Vietnam; yet, the United 
States lost the Vietnam War. Another case study was that although the U.S. was the 
hegemonic world power in 2001, it did not succeed in preventing terrorist attacks on 
September 11.  
      As it has been noted in the above chapter, the list of definitions and examples of 
power is extensive, but not exhaustive. To reiterate, power is “the ability to overcome 
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obstacles and influence outcomes;” more specifically, the ability to get what one wants in 
order to accomplish a “desired outcome through control of one’s social and physical 
environment.”85 Because the focus of this chapter is power in international relations, let’s 
examine the role of power globally and its relationship among states.  
Power in International Relations 
      Power has been an integral part of international politics, starting from the 
international interactions of an Ancient Greek historian and Athenian general, 
Thucydides, with other states to the present.86 Furthermore, in Power and International 
Relations Baldwin elucidates that the reason power matters is that different fields have 
different approaches to power concept. 87 For instance, international relations, Baldwin 
claims to be power politics, referring to the fact that all politics involve power; however, 
politics is not only about power. In the spectrum of international relations, some nations 
have greater influence or control over other nations; that is to say, Western powers like 
the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany. Hence, power is the ability to 
exercise political, social or economic control or exert influence and authority.  
       In international relations the discussion of power falls within the scope of how power 
affects the state’s behavior towards another international actor. Defining power clearly 
gives the reader a window into understanding state behavior. According to Morgenthau, 
whatever the final agenda of international politics is, power is always the immediate 
aim.88 Therefore, states compete for power, which helps clarify the nature of the 
competition. If one understands more fully what power is, one can appreciate better what !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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states compete for. Yet, according to Russett et al., some scholars argue that despite 
power’s central role in international relations, power may take different forms. 89 To 
summarize, understanding the true nature of power might help illuminate how and why 
international actors compete among themselves. 
       The nature of power in international relations refers to state actors competing with 
other state actors. Hence, the nature of power explains why some actors have a different 
interpretation of the concepts of power. What are the possible interpretations of power 
according to international actors? What is power to them? How it is being used, namely, 
how, why and why not, international actors share a similar view of the world economy 
and of power resources? In any event, power is central to international relations, and it 
takes different forms. For these reasons, there are two distinctive types of power in the 
international system: hard power and soft power. Although hard power is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, it is helpful to define it and see how some states make use of it. 
Hard Power 
      Hard power refers to the “ability to coerce,” and “it grows out of a country’s military 
and economic might.”90 Hard power employs the carrot and sticks approach, used 
frequently in political science, to indicate that carrots serve as inducements such as 
reducing trade barriers, creating an alliance or military protection. In contrast, the sticks 
refer to threats such as a military intervention, an embargo as an economic sanction, or 
applying coercive diplomacy as in the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Thus, some 
international actors like the United States, Israel, and Great Britain use a militaristic 
interpretation of the concept of power; that is to say, hard power. What’s more, by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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employing hard power to their foreign policies, one may understand how these state 
actors behave in international relations in order to accomplish their goals. Moreover, 
these international actors share a traditional realpolitik mind-set, often considered by 
political science scholars as a realist approach in international politics.  
Power as influence 
      Notwithstanding, not all international actors follow the realist approach, empowered 
by the Western powers; specifically, Canada, France, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and 
many others. As a result, hard power is not a common scenario in their foreign policies. 
Although all of these international actors are U.S. allies, the manner in which they behave 
in the arena of international relations rarely involves power as a militaristic approach. 
Instead, these international actors are mostly concerned with power as a process of 
exercising influence. After all, the beginning of this chapter presented power not only as 
the ability to coerce, but also as the ability to influence. For instance, Robert Dahl uses 
the model of state A causing state B to perform something that state B would not do 
otherwise. In other words, state A is the international actor that exercises influence, 
whereas state B is the influenced actor.91 Consequently, actor A causes a change in the 
behavior of actor B. It is important to note that influence can vary; for example, 
compellence, also known as coercive diplomacy as in the case of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis in 1962. Another form of influence could be deterrence where during the Cold War 
the U.S. attempted to deter the former Soviet Union from a possible nuclear attack and 
vice versa.92  
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      Besides the above examples of power being exercised through the lens of influence, 
another form of influence, according to Russett et al., “is influence over the values held 
by other states, and therefore what they take to be their own interests, goals, and desired 
outcomes.”93 In international relations or political science that type of influence as a 
power source happens through attraction, also known as soft power.  
Soft Power 
    In the field of international relations, Joseph Nye is considered the father of the term 
soft power, which he coined in 1990, referring to the ability of a country to persuade 
another country through attraction. 94 Soft power rests on a country’s desire to achieve 
outcomes through convincing the other country to admire its values, and follow its 
examples. Equally important, soft power is the ability to shape other states’ long-term 
attitudes and preferences, which benefits the initiative country by creating alliances. 
Accordingly, Nye distinguishes the levels of attraction in soft power. 95 First, there is the 
so-called personal level, where one encounters attraction or seduction. Second, when 
there is a relationship or a marriage, power lies in the “chemistry of attraction.”96 Third, 
in the practice of business, CEOs of companies are aware that leadership requires 
“attracting others to do what one wants,” not simply relying on giving orders to others. 97 
Hence, the power of attraction, described here as soft power is the necessity to get others 
to buy in to one’s values. 98 
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The Advantages of Soft Power 
      According to Joseph S. Nye, the advantage of soft power, as the power of attraction, 
over hard power is that soft power does more than persuading the adversary through 
deliberation. Because soft power is attractive power, its resources are the key to 
producing attraction, which often brings forward understanding between nation-states.99 
To illustrate, in the mid 1970s during concessions over France selling Pakistan a nuclear 
plant, the U.S. government, led by the Ford and Carter administrations, attempted to stop 
France from selling the plant to Pakistan. 100 However, the French government refused to 
cooperate until June 1977, when Jimmy Carter’s nonproliferation policy convinced 
French government officials not to sell the plant to Pakistan because of fear of using it for 
either civilian purposes or for bombs. 101 Accordingly, the U.S. government succeeded in 
convincing France not to sell the nuclear plant to Pakistan without inducing threats or the 
traditional carrots and sticks approach, both being indispensable elements of hard power 
in U.S. foreign policy. Instead, the U.S. government used the power of persuasion to 
influence the behavior of France. In brief, the U.S. government incorporated a successful 
soft power approach, built on trust and persuasion that not only avoided a threat, but also 
proved to be as effective as a hard power approach could have been. 
The disadvantages of soft power 
      As has been noted, soft power has advantages over hard power, but many object to 
the use of soft power because they only look at power as nothing but a source of 
command, force or control. That is to say, influence, attraction, and persuasion are often 
underestimated as a power source in international relations. Furthermore, influence, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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attraction, and persuasion are all abilities that help produce desired outcomes, yet 
avoiding the use of force or threat such as a military might.  
      Conversely, unlike hard power, soft power relies on “willing interpreters and 
receivers;” therefore, in order to have such, it is important ”who relates to whom under 
what circumstances.”102 For instance, if two international actors share a similar culture, it 
is likely for both actors to attract each other because of the cultural similarities they share. 
Therefore, desired outcomes are more likely to produce soft power, unlike two actors 
with different cultures. Although the effects of U.S. softer power on Europe during the 
Cold War did not happen overnight, provided the fact that “the cultural differences 
between the U.S. and Europe were not as great as those between the U.S. and the Middle 
East,” cultural boundaries did not stop Japan and South Korea, or Turkey and Bangladesh 
from becoming democratic, despite the longer timeframe of the latter.103 
       Equally important, soft power can be prolonged as it takes longer to produce the 
desired outcomes, which is also why so many skeptics object to it. In like manner, soft 
power has the ability to persuade through attraction but on a personal or individual level 
as opposed to a national level, wherein there are various actors who may or may not like 
the attraction.  
Soft Power Resources 
      For instance, some soft power resources could be ideology, the protection of human 
rights, education, international institutions, and most importantly, cultural attraction. Soft 
power can be extracted from media, the arts, peacekeeping, economic aid, visits, 
exchange programs, teaching a nation’s language, and promoting the studies of other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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cultures and languages. Accordingly, to project soft power through U.S. traditions, 
values, and culture has enabled Washington to attract many critical partners and 
supporters through companies, institutions, foundations, and universities. All of these 
aspects mediate soft power by framing the first most important step of it: to spread 
appreciation and assertiveness, wherein both combined favor the source country. 
Therefore, soft power can be beneficial to the United States in educating the U.S. 
populace about Muslim culture, and spreading U.S. cultural values to the Arab world.  
Culture as a Soft Power Resource 
      The relationship between culture and power can be seen in the many examples of 
American culture as a source of soft power. For instance, American education has served 
as a magnet for many foreign students, who after graduating have returned to their 
homelands and have incorporated American values and traditions into their native 
cultures. Namely, some of these foreign students end up taking high positions in politics, 
education, and the arts in their native lands. Therefore, by utilizing American education 
in other countries, former students “can affect policy outcomes,” that are crucial to U.S. 
foreign policy. 104 To illustrate, the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who is a 
Harvard University graduate, is one of the many former foreign students in the U.S., who 
has established an amicable relationship with U.S. political leaders. Secretary of State 
Colin Powell sees the alliance of potential political leaders, “who have been educated in 
the U.S., as a valuable asset.”105  
      American popular culture has also served as an attraction to achieve desired 
outcomes. For instance, “the apartheid regime in South Africa, the increase in the number !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104 Ibid., 45. 
105 Quoted in Nye, “Sources of American Soft Power,” in Soft Power: the Means to Success in World 
Politics, 44. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Torkom Movsesiyan 
! #$!
of democratic governments in Latin America and parts of East Asia, and pressure for 
liberalization in Iran.”106 The popular music of Elvis Presley, The Beatles, and John 
Lennon made significant contribution to projecting soft power during the Cold War. 
What’s more, the spread of American news to Iran was possible through private 
American TV broadcasts; for example, the Iranian community in Los Angeles 
broadcasted from Iran and vice versa. 107 It is also important to note that although 
American popular culture, such as Hollywood movies or pop music, attracts much of the 
younger generation abroad, the unattractiveness of U.S. foreign policy may serve as an 
opportunity for the following generation to mistrust or be in doubt with the legitimacy of 
American power. 
Soft Power and U.S. Foreign Policy   
      Because soft power is a power of attraction, the nature of attraction depends on the  
values a country employs in its foreign policy; hence, the more attractive the values of a 
country are, the more attractive its foreign policy becomes. Consequently, soft power 
depends on the type of foreign policy objectives a government pursues. In other words, 
the more attractive the policy objectives are, the more they can be shared with other 
international actors. Joseph Nye clarifies that broad foreign policies, including those that 
contain “far-sighted definition of the national interest,” are more efficient because they 
are more attractive to other actors, compared to foreign policies, based on “a narrow and 
myopic perspective.”108  
       For example, the United States, has been striving to incorporate important U.S. 
values that appeal to others, such as democracy and human rights since its foundation. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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What’s more, realists like John Adams have done so, along with followers of Woodrow 
Wilson, and neoconservatives, who after 9/11 urged former U.S. President, George W. 
Bush, “not to adopt a narrow view of U.S. national interests, and make religious freedom, 
human rights, and democracy priorities to U.S. foreign policy.”109  
       As a result of George W. Bush’s unilateral foreign policy, America’s attractiveness 
overseas has been declining since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003; therefore, anti-
Americanism overseas has increased. What’s more foreign policy objectives, employed 
by the Bush administration, have contributed to the negative view of America and its 
people by many countries, including those of the Middle East and North Africa.  
Anti-Americanism 
      In order to understand anti-Americanism, it is important to shed light not only on its 
sources, but also its consequences. Various scholars have defined anti-Americanism 
differently; for example, according to Alvin Rubenstein and Donald Smith, anti-
Americanism is “actions or statements that involve sanctions or attacks against the 
policy, society, culture, and values of the United States.”110 However, Russel Berman 
defines it as “a form of prejudice, in which views toward the U.S. are immutable, 
irrational, and even obsessive.”111 Although both definitions exclude both information 
about the sources of anti-Americanism and what causes irrational views of the U.S., data 
drawn from polls clearly indicates the decline of both America’s attractiveness and 
favorable attitude towards the U.S. To illustrate, in 2007, a Pew Global Poll reports that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!*+)!,-./01!&"0!!**+!Alvin Rubenstein, and Donald Smith, “Anti-Americanism: Anatomy of a Phenomenon,” in Anti-
Americanism in the Third World, ed. Alvin Rubenstein and Donald Smith (New York: Praeger, 1985), 
quoted in Monti Datta, “The Decline of America’s Soft Power in the United Nations” (PhD diss., 
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compared to 2000 British, French, German, Russian, and Turkish public opinion on 
favorable attitudes towards the U.S. has decreased in 2006.112 Moreover, unfavorable 
ratings of the U.S. in Turkey are among the lowest in the world: starting from 52% in 
1999/2000 to 12% in 2006.113  
       According to Nye, The United States has lost its attractiveness in several past cases. 
For example, during the Vietnam War and “the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear 
weapons in Germany in the early eighties.”114 Consequently, the loss of U.S. 
attractiveness had negative outcomes; namely, the inability of former President, Lyndon 
Johnson, to persuade other countries to cooperate in the Vietnam War.          
      In like manner, anti-Americanism continues to grow, especially right after 9/11 when 
the world was very sympathetic towards the U.S. invasion in Iraq in 2003. Paul Kelly 
reports, 
      The lesson of Iraq is that the U.S.’s soft power is in decline. Bush went to war having   
      failed to win a broader military coalition or UN authorization. This had two direct  
      consequences: a rise in anti-Americanism sentiment, lifting terrorist recruitment; and  
      a higher cost to the U.S. for the war and reconstruction effort.115 
      That is why the United States has lost its support, especially, in Islamic countries. 
According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, those who had unfavorable ratings of the 
United States mentioned that they disagreed with the Bush administration’s foreign 
policy rather than American values and culture.116 Hence, the percentage of those who !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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are in support of the U.S. is below 15 % in Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Jordan, and 
about 27 percent in Morocco and Lebanon. 117As a result, Richard Bernstein describes the 
image of the United States as nothing but a “classically imperialist power.” 118 It would 
be inaccurate to simply state that anti-Americanism in the Islamic world is only due to 
the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Equally important, anti-Americanism can be a 
byproduct of U.S. foreign policies that impose Western values of democracy on the 
Islamic world, and primarily pro-Israeli U.S. foreign policies in regards to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  
      Anti-Americanism has also affected the relationship between the United States and 
the United Nations (U.N.). The United Nations is a multilateral intergovernmental 
organization that was founded in 1945 after World War II, replacing its ancestor, the 
League of Nations, in order to prevent aggression between states, such as war, and most 
importantly, to build a platform for a dialogue between state actors. The United Nations 
is not only the pioneer of legitimacy in international relations, but it is also known for its 
ability to develop soft power and to attract international actors’ consent when voting for 
or vetoing resolutions. In fact, Monti Datta states that in the case of anti-American 
sentiment in a country, the government of that country might break away from supporting 
U.S. foreign policy within international organizations like the U.N. by threatening to vote 
against issues that are considered important to U.S. national interests. 119  Specifically, 
both Russia and France threatened to veto U.S. plans to invade Iraq in 2003.  
       As a result, public opinion plays a critical role in democratic societies like France, 
Great Britain, and Germany because “political elites generally consider and enact the will !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of the public;” otherwise, “their political survival may be in jeopardy.”120 Accordingly, 
Datta hypothesizes that “there is a positive relationship between public approval of the 
United States within a given country and the level of voting coincidence that country 
shares with the U.S. on UNGA lobbied votes, other things being equal.”121 Finally, 
American soft power in the U.N. has declined and ignoring it may cause negative 
consequences; especially, for U.S.-Middle East relations. 
Soft Power in the Middle East 
       Projecting U.S. soft power in the Middle East is an arduous challenge that requires 
time, commitment, and financial investment. Although culture can be attractive to some, 
it may not appeal to others, namely, dissimilar cultures such as American versus Middle 
Eastern, and North African culture. Moreover, after 9/11 the nature of power has changed 
because both terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism have penetrated the Middle East and 
North Africa. In like manner, if the United States wants to continue to be the world’s 
policeman, when fighting terrorism, the U.S. needs cooperation from other countries. 
Because a terrorist transnational network like al Qaeda, has numerous cells in many 
countries, U.S. troops cannot reach every single one of them on their own. Instead, 
capturing al Qaeda terrorists, therefore, defeating terrorism requires partners and alliances 
with other states. Yet, partnership with other states depends on America’s willingness and 
ability to project soft power through attractive U.S. foreign policies that can persuade 
international actors to cooperate. To reiterate, cooperation is enhanced through soft 
power.  
       However, the U.S. government has undermined America’s attractiveness in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Middle East and North Africa. As a result, the U.S. has paid a high price; that is to say, 
the loss of civilian cooperation, the disapproval of public opinion, and the unwillingness 
of close U.S. allies, such as France to cooperate in the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
George W. Bush’s unilateral foreign policy approach has caused not only a higher cost to 
the U.S. for the Iraq War, but also for Iraq’s rebuilding input. It is also important to note 
that the majority of people in Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Morocco, and the Palestinian 
Authority mentioned that “they had more confidence in Osama bin Laden than in George 
W. Bush or Tony Blair.”122  
      Besides the U.S. invasion of Iraq and terrorism that stirred anti-Americanism in the 
Middle East, clashes between moderates and radicals in the Islamic world are not to be 
dismissed when we address U.S. soft power. The Middle East and North Africa have not 
been able to adapt to Western values of democracy. In addition, unemployment among 
the youth in the Middle East has skyrocketed along with stagnant economic growth, 
where illiteracy among women still remains high. Islamic ideology can be traced from the 
epicenter of Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia, to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and the 
Islamic state of Iran. Finally, Nye suggests that the U.S. should include foreign policies 
that are attractive to moderate Moslems, if it wants “to win.”123 Despite the opposition 
from Islamic extremists and terrorists in the Middle East, Nye explains that “the grounds 
for [U.S.] soft power [in the Middle East] exist, but the world’s leading communications 
country [the U.S.A.] has proved surprisingly maladroit in exploiting those 
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opportunities.”124  
      For these reasons, it is important to draw an analogy to the sources of soft power 
during the Cold War, when the U.S. government successfully employed soft power 
strategies to counteract Communist ideologies and the spread of Soviet Union influence. 
The battle of winning the hearts and minds of the Soviets through soft power required a 
long commitment, but succeeded in the long run. Notwithstanding, European culture was 
dissimilar to American culture. Therefore, cultural boundaries between the West and the 
Islamic world might require more time, but as Joseph Nye reiterates, “The long-run 
strategy for the transformation of Iraq and the Middle East,” as implemented by the Bush 
administration, “will not succeed without a similar role for American (and others’) soft 
power.”125  
Soft Power During the Cold War 
        Soft power resources were critical for the U.S. in Soviet Union relations during the 
Cold War. Similarly, the Soviet Union projected its soft power in its relations with the 
United States by investing billions of dollars in public diplomacy, namely, promoting its 
culture, technology, science, sports, dance, music, and media. Probably the most 
important aspect of the Soviet soft power resources was cultural diplomacy. Therefore, 
the Soviets invested highly in the arts. To illustrate, major ballet companies, symphony 
orchestras, and even sports teams that won gold medals were some of the resources of 
cultural diplomacy that attracted Soviet culture in the U.S. In like manner, former U.S. 
President Eisenhower’s cultural diplomacy program sent American dance artists to the 
Soviet Union to dispel the notion of Americans as nothing but “boorish, uncultured, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
124 Joseph Nye,  “Wielding Soft Power,” in Soft Power: the Means to Succeed in the World Politics (New 
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superficial, and materialistic.”126 Lastly, American dance artists served as cultural 
diplomats in host countries, and “broke down barriers between cultures and 
ideologies.”127 
      During the Cold War educational exchange became an integral part of U.S. foreign 
policy. Exchange programs attracted many foreign students to the U.S. from various parts 
of the world. In retrospect, foreign students were educated about American traditions and 
values. In the same sense, American scholars and educators were sent overseas to educate 
the populace about American culture and lifestyles. 128 A cultural diplomacy expert, 
Cynthia Schneider, explains that through the ability of U.S. diplomats to relate to the 
significance of cultural exchange with the Soviets to recognize “their literary and artistic 
achievements, the U.S. government became an ally with the Soviets.”129 Despite the 
differences between the systems of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the advocacy of 
cultural diplomacy with the Soviets as a soft power resource can be seen as a diplomatic 
tool for increasing mutual understanding in U.S.-Soviet relations. Therefore, an important 
but neglected diplomatic tool in international relations today is cultural diplomacy.  
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                                                    CHAPTER IV 
                                         CULTURAL DIPLOMACY 
“Culture humanizes what politics demonizes.” 
   --Wole Soyinka.130 
 
       In order to better understand the trajectory of culture diplomacy in international 
relations, it is important to look at the theoretical framework of this phenomenon.  
Historical background of diplomacy 
       Diplomacy, the art of negotiation, has been present since the second or fourth 
millennium BCE. The practice of diplomacy was first developed in the late fifteenth 
century in Italy, as best described in the alacrity of Niccolò Machiavelli, whose approach 
was later adopted by the French system. That led to “the first fully-developed” modern 
system of diplomacy by the British scholar and diplomat, Harold Nicolson, in the mid-
twentieth century.131 According to Berridge, the term diplomacy was first referred to as 
negotiation during the diplomatic missions of the first minister of Louis XIII, Cardinal 
Richelieu.132 
      Nicholas Cull distinguishes three important definitions of diplomacy. First, in broad  
terms, diplomacy can be defined as “the mechanisms short of war deployed by an 
international actor to manage the international environment.”133 Diplomacy, in general, is 
practiced by a variety of actors, such as non-governmental, governmental, international, 
and multi-national organizations. Second, traditional diplomacy is best known as “the 
international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through 
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engagement with another international actor.”134 To illustrate, in the field of international 
relations traditional diplomacy is practiced by diplomats, government officials, 
consulates, and embassies. Third, public diplomacy is described as “an international 
actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with a 
foreign public.”135 Unlike traditional diplomacy, which usually encompasses relations 
between governments, public diplomacy not only focuses on the interaction between 
governments, but also it targets foreign audiences through foreign policy goals.  
      In the U.S., the term public diplomacy was coined between 1965 and 1970 during the 
Cold War era. In another sense, public diplomacy was often labeled as propaganda, used 
by U.S. government officials and politicians to accomplish their foreign policies. 
However, Eytan Gilboa (2008) argues that because public diplomacy is mistaken by 
scholars and politicians with propaganda, measured only through opinion polls and media 
coverage, “its essence and uniqueness” are underestimated.136 Cold War public 
diplomacy clearly illustrates that “if public opinion in the target society is persuaded to 
accept a favorable image of the other side, it will exert pressure on its government to alter 
existing hostile attitudes and policies.”137 During the Cold War, both the United States 
and the Soviet Union used international broadcasting, an important element of public 
diplomacy, to draw a positive image to the domestic ideologies of each country.  
History of cultural diplomacy 
      An important element of public diplomacy is cultural diplomacy, i.e. “the exchange 
of ideas, art, thoughts, beliefs, information, values, systems, and other features of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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culture,” necessary to foster mutual understanding among nations.138 Although this thesis 
will explain that cultural diplomacy is an important but neglected diplomatic tool in U.S.-
Egypt relations nowadays, it is important to point out that cultural diplomacy is not  
limited to just cultural exchanges between nations. What’s more, cultural diplomacy can 
be practiced between individuals, communities, organizations or cities in a single nation.  
      According to Clifford Geertz, culture is “a system of inherited conceptions expressed 
in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their 
knowledge about and attitudes toward life” that has been transmitted throughout  
history.139 As has been noted, culture is an important soft power resource, and the core of 
cultural diplomacy. According to Marta Osojnik, the author of Cultural Diplomacy and 
the European Union: Key Characters and Historical Development, cultural diplomacy 
“has existed since the beginning of civilization, in one form or another, under one name 
or another.”140 Because the focus of this thesis is U.S. cultural diplomacy, it is important 
to examine the history of U.S. cultural diplomacy. 
      Throughout history, cultural diplomacy has existed in ancient times, namely, in 
Ancient Greece during “the construction of the great library at Alexandria.”141 In like 
manner, cultural diplomacy has been an integral part of “the Roman Republic’s policy 
inviting the sons of “friendly kings from their borders to be educated in Rome,” which 
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can also be seen today in the following organizations: the British Council and the Italian 
Cultural Institute.142 Equally important, France has always been the pioneer of large 
investments in cultural diplomacy through the realm of educational institutions, designed 
to preserve French language and culture.   
      Perhaps a prime example of the potential of cultural diplomacy can be traced as far as  
     1785 in Thomas Jefferson’s letters to James Madison, during Jefferson’s visit to Paris,  
      I am an enthusiast on the subject of the arts. But it is an enthusiasm of which I am not          
      ashamed, as its object is to improve the taste of my countrymen, to increase their 
      reputation, to reconcile to them the respect of the world and procure them its     
      praise.143 
      Some of the first public diplomacy efforts by the United States began with the 
foundation of Robert College in what is known today as Turkey in 1863, and the 
American University of Beirut in Lebanon in 1866.144 Both of these efforts embarked on 
an important educational exchange between the United States and the Middle East, which 
have lasted for more than a century. During World War I, President Wilson founded the 
Committee on Public Information (CPI), which became the first example of foreign 
information policy. 145 Consequently, the Institute of International Education, one of the 
first public diplomacy institutions in the U.S., was founded by both former Secretary of 
State, Elihu Root, and Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, in 
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1919.146 For these reasons, John Lenczowski elucidates their ideology to be that peace 
could be accomplished through international understanding, promoted by international 
educational exchange. 147  
     Equally important, during World War I political figures used the so-called, Wireless 
File, a transmission of ideas through “industrial-age communication technologies,” such 
as telegraphs, undersea cables, and radio to magnetize not only opinion of foreign 
government officials, but also public opinion in other states around the world.148 
According to Bruce Gregory, the World War I period marks the groundwork for enabling 
international affairs among states through the realm of cultural diplomacy. 149 The United 
States along with Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union used cultural diplomacy 
aggressively to prevent upcoming wars from happening through educational and 
scientific exchanges.150 Unlike European state’s ministries of culture, the United States’ 
cultural diplomacy initiatives were driven by private philanthropy such as the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, the Rockefeller and Guggenheim Foundations.151  
      The antecedent of the current U.S. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs was 
founded in 1938, and known as the Division of Cultural Relations in the U.S. State 
Department. 152As a result, several cultural and broadcasting organizations were created 
by the U.S. government; namely, the Creel Committee, and later on the Office of the 
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA). In 1936, the United States government 
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engaged in promoting exchange programs for both students and artists, during the signing 
of the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations in Buenos 
Aires. 153 
      The CIAA was founded in 1940 by President Franklin Roosevelt to improve cultural 
and economic relations between the U.S. and Latin America, specifically Brazil, to 
counteract fascist influence and ensure hegemonic stability. This was the highlight of the 
U.S.-Latin American alliance, known as the Good Neighbor Policy, where the CIAA was 
the first major investment in U.S. cultural diplomacy. According to Darlene Sadlier, this 
period was the first time in U.S. history when artists played a significant role in U.S. 
public policy. 154 The CIAA invested in promoting several art exhibitions of U.S. 
paintings in Latin America with the help of the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), called 
the Inter-American art project. In addition, the Inter-American art project helped host art 
exhibits of many Latin American works in U.S. museums, institutions and private 
companies.155  
      Besides art exhibitions, the CIAA sponsored the first ballet company in American 
history to tour South America in 1941. Namely, the American Ballet Caravan, led by 
choreographer George Balanchine, was sent by the CIAA on a twenty-eight week tour 
and it received a grant of $100,000. According to Bernard Taper, the reason behind this 
dance tour was for the U.S. government to convince the South-American people that 
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America was not just materialistic.156 
      The CIAA served as a platform for many artists, filmmakers, and writers from both 
the U.S. and Latin America to learn from each other and build an amicable bond. As a 
result, these artists “felt that culture was a recognizable and integral part of U.S. foreign 
diplomacy.”157 Sad to say, the end of World War II terminated the CIAA in 1946.  
      The end of World War II caused the United States to decrease its budget on 
educational and cultural exchange programs. For these reasons, some of the already 
designated offices for cultural activities were consolidated with the U.S. State 
Department. However, because of America’s recovery and reconstruction efforts in the 
aftermath of World War II, the U.S. Department of State sponsored several speakers, art 
exhibits, and performing artists to be sent to American libraries and cultural centers in 
Germany, Austria, Western Europe, and even Japan. 158 
       It is also important to note that many of today’s exchange programs were possible 
thanks to Senator J. William Fulbright’s 1946 amendment to the Surplus Property Act of 
1944 that enabled finances for America’s most known academic exchange program—the 
Fulbright Academic Exchange Program. 159 The Fulbright Program is a product of 
America’s cultural diplomacy efforts that provides grants or scholarships for American 
and foreign students, scholars, professionals, teachers, and administrators. This academic 
program is binational with the help and support of foreign governments in fifty-one 
countries.160 Following the Surplus Property Act of 1944, in 1948 the so-called second 
mandate, launched the Smith-Mundt Act that initiated America’s cultural and educational !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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exchange programs through cultural diplomacy with the goal of building a mutual 
cultural understanding with other nations.161  
Cultural diplomacy during the Cold War 
       The Cold War illuminates the highlights of cultural diplomacy in U.S. history. This 
war was a clash of dissimilar cultures, wherein two major powers, the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union, competed in both military might and ideologies. That is why, the Cold War is also 
known as the war of ideas, where “cold warriors” competed in a “battle for the hearts and 
minds of men.”162 As influential as American pop music is today around the world, 
during the Cold War, jazz and rock’n roll became productive tools for cultural 
diplomacy. To illustrate, the U.S. State Department sent jazz legends, Dizzy Gillespie 
and Louis Armstrong, on a world tour to Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, 
and the Soviet Union. According to Cynthia Schneider, a cultural diplomacy expert, jazz 
and rock’n roll helped people in authoritarian regimes to enjoy “moments of freedom 
while listening, and it provided a unifying bond for young people” around the world. 163 
       Another very powerful example of cultural diplomacy as an important diplomatic 
tool was the New York Philharmonic Symphony’s (NYPS) tour in Latin America in 
1958, supported by Vice President Nixon’s administration. Consequently, in May 1958, 
mobs in Caracas, Venezuela were outraged with Nixon’s administration. Yet, around the 
same time the NYPS had been warmly welcomed thanks to a tremendous success in 
every Latin American country it traveled to. In that same year, The New York World 
Telegram reported that although successful cultural activities cannot commensurate with 
America’s economic and political decline in Latin America and other countries, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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NYPS has helped “win the minds of alien and suspicious people.”164 Furthermore, “the 
gentlefolk in the Kremlin delight in picturing Americans as Babbitts braying in a cultural 
desert. Tours such as the Philharmonic’s provide a sure and relatively inexpensive way of 
proving them wrong.”165 Hence, these cultural activities imply the success of U.S. 
cultural diplomacy as a tool for conformity and released tension between nations. 
      The struggle for public opinion on behalf of the U.S. Department of State was a 
concerted effort to present the American way of life as liberal and democratic, unlike a 
communist foe—the Soviet Union. For example, in 1959 an American National 
Exhibition presented the innovations of American technology, as demonstrated in 
Moscow during the so-called kitchen debate between President Krushchev and President 
Nixon, wherein the latter linked American freedom to material plethora.166 As a result, 
the Soviets depicted Americans as “gum chewing, insensitive, and materialistic 
barbarians,” according to a New Jersey congressman, who was in favor of the arts.167  
      In another example, in 1948, the author of Dance for Export: Cultural Diplomacy and 
the Cold War, Naima Prevots shared that when she and her parents embarked on a family 
trip to Israel and Europe, people were surprised to learn that Americans “read books, 
went to museums, ate in cheap restaurants, could speak French and Hebrew, and did not 
own a car.”168 Equally important, during the Cold War most countries around world 
viewed Americans as nothing but “boorish, uncultured, superficial, and materialistic.”169 
According to Eric Foner, for these instances of negative portrayals of America and its 
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people overseas, the U.S. State Department engaged in presenting a positive U.S. image 
through dance diplomacy. 170 
Dance as a Weapon during the Cold War: A Successful Case Study 
      As U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War emerged, the U.S. Department of State 
increased funding for cultural diplomacy. The Department of State invested heavily in the 
arts, especially dance, as a tool to export American values of democracy and freedom 
overseas to counteract Soviet communism. Cultural diplomacy during the Cold War 
marked the U.S. government’s most momentous support for the arts, when dance was 
used as a weapon in U.S.-Soviet diplomatic relations. Although dance played a small but 
significant role in U.S.-Soviet cultural diplomacy, very little, if any credit has been given 
to dance artists, who served as cultural diplomats overseas, as mandated by the U.S. 
government. 
       In order to understand this phenomenon, it is important to elucidate the role of dance 
artists as cultural diplomats. 
      President Dwight D. Eisenhower should be given credit for his support for the 
performing arts in cultural diplomacy during the Cold War, when he authorized the 
Emergency Fund for International Affairs in 1954. The Emergency Fund encompassed 
America’s first cultural export program, designed to promote the performing arts. 
Funding for the performing arts consisted of $2,250,000. In addition, the United States 
Information Agency (USIA), originally founded in 1953, was given $157,000 for the 
promotion of performing arts and sports.171 Equally important, government financial 
support was combined with funding from the private sector.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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      According to Prevots, President Eisenhower not only realized the significance of 
performing arts in America, but also he saw it as an indispensible diplomatic tool in the 
formation of “world peace.”172 Among the exported cultural activities of America were 
dance, music, and theatre organizations in politically hot spots. America’s image overseas 
was strengthened by the Eisenhower’s Emergency Fund through dance artists, who 
served as cultural diplomats and exported the arts. Consequently, dance artists “did so not 
only as performers but also as individuals, whose interactions with citizens of the host 
country broke down barriers between cultures and ideologies.”173  
     Because the central focus of this thesis is dance in cultural diplomacy, let’s examine 
the tours of performing artists overseas, who served as cultural diplomats during the Cold 
War. In 1954, the State Department decided to send performing artists to represent the 
U.S. at both the Inter-American Economic and Social Council in Rio de Janeiro and the 
United Nations Economic Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) conference in 
Montevideo.  
       In 1955, USIA’s paranoia about the spread of communism in South America was the 
State Department’s rationale to send a Mexican-born and Spanish-speaking dance artist, 
José Limón, on a tour to South America.174 Therefore, the José Limón Dance Company, 
founded in 1946, became officially the first dance company to be sponsored under the 
Emergency Fund, and sent on a tour to both Brazil and Uruguay. After receiving rave 
reviews from critics in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Montevideo, the U.S. Embassy 
contacted the State Department to congratulate José Limón Company’s “artistic and 
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personal success.”175  
      In 1955, the cast of Porgy and Bess was sent on a tour in many countries around the 
world, including Moscow in the Soviet Union, and the Middle East, specifically, Cairo, 
Egypt and Tel Aviv, Israel. After a successful performance in Cairo, former President 
Nasser expressed his appreciation towards the cast of Porgy and for their the 
performance. Furthermore, as delighted as President Nasser was from the performance, 
he enthusiastically reported, “If this is propaganda, let us have more of it.”176 Prevots 
reports that in Tel Aviv Porgy and Bess sold out, and the Russian Ambassador expressed 
his enjoyment of the performance to Ira Gershwin as, “Oh—if only WE had a PORGY 
AND BESS—WE—would—send—it! and then he wound up with an ‘on!’ and a global 
gesture. It is impossible to transmit on paper the knowing intent of his gesture.”177  
      In another instance, the Symphony of the Air toured in Japan, becoming the first 
Western orchestra to visit Japan and to win the admiration of not only Japanese people, 
but also Japanese government officials, diplomats, ambassadors, and industrial leaders. 
An American Embassy report from Japan indicates that the Japanese expressed 
“eagerness to come more closely in tough with Americans and American thought and 
life.”178 Rave reviews followed in major Japanese newspapers, reporting that audience 
members “forgot for the moment their social status…nationalities, and racial 
differences…Music is really an excellent bridge to transport the friendly feelings of 
nations.”179 All of these powerful statements indicate the magnitude of culture as a power 
resource in cultural diplomacy; not to mention that music is a universal language that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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unites people from all over the world. To sum up, as one U.S. representative expressed 
that American music and its “individual activities and attitudes have done more towards 
establishing a close rapport between our countries than a staff of attaché could hope to do 
in years.”180  
      The enlistment of performing artists, who served as cultural diplomats under the 
auspices of the State Department, was administered by the American National Theater 
and Academy (ANTA), founded in 1935. In regards to dance artists, the Dance Panel 
became the determining body of all the dancers, who served as cultural diplomats 
overseas. It is helpful to contextualize the pre-conditions, set by the Dance Panel, in order 
to understand the challenges and struggles of American dance artists prior to their 
enlistment of cultural diplomats overseas.  
      The minutes of the Dance Panel, as reported by Prevots indicate the stigma against 
many American dancers, attached to the rationale behind the selection of dance artists. 
Because the Dance Panel was based in New York City, bias and prejudice against 
dancers was not as strong as that of other places in the U.S. where dancers were not 
welcomed or supported. For instance, Martha Graham, a modern dance icon was one of 
them. Her dance choreographies were neither “easily accessible, nor enjoyed a mass 
following in the U.S.”181 Although puritanical views of Martha Graham criticized her 
choreographies for including themes of sexuality, the State Department regarded her 
dance company and choreographies as the prime example of America’s freedom and 
liberty.  
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      Equally important, the Dance Panel sought to present overseas the uniqueness of 
American dance. To illustrate, in 1955 the American image overseas was negative 
because it was perceived as undemocratic, even prior to the struggle for civil rights in the 
U.S. At that time, communism swept across the Asian and African continent, which led 
to the necessity of enhancing the American image abroad. As Martha Graham’s dance 
company included a diversity of Asian and African artists, the State Department saw it as 
an opportunity to improve its negative image abroad through the enlistment of a 
multiracial dance company to represent America. Consequently, Martha Graham was sent 
on a tour to politically hot spots, where anti-Americanism was not a new phenomenon. 
Martha Graham’s mission as a cultural diplomat included countries like Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaya, Singapore, Burma, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Ceylon. 182 
      It is imperative to mention that although Indonesia was one of those countries whose 
government was very critical of the U.S., Martha Graham’s lecture performances were a 
smash hit, where her shows were not only sold out, but also had to be moved into larger 
spaces that could accommodate the enormous crowd of patrons. In like manner, Graham 
shows received rave reviews in Indonesian newspapers, where Graham broke down 
ideologies that proved wrong previous notions of  “Americans living in a cultural 
wasteland only with gadgets and frankfurters and atom bombs.”183 Furthermore, Burmese 
Prime Minister U Nu’s statement compared Martha Graham to be an important cultural 
ambassador as that of Soviet artists. Of utmost importance is Burmese Prime Minister’s 
acknowledgement that “Miss Graham can very effectively contribute towards 
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international goodwill and therefore [she is] a potent force for peace.”184 Giving the 
importance of dance in cultural diplomacy in this thesis, such an empowering statement 
by U Nu elucidates the effectiveness of the performing arts as a diplomatic tool in 
international relations.   
     Unlike Graham’s previous experience in her home country, where her choreographies 
were considered risky and controversial because of themes of sexuality, her successful 
diplomatic missions to anti-American countries, where her work was unknown, helped 
her gain more popularity and credibility not only abroad, but also in the U.S. In other 
words, as dance artists conquered abroad, their reputation back home was strengthened. 
Hence, they became America’s goodwill ambassadors. 
     The Dance Panel saw new dance styles such as avant-garde, created by dance artists, 
as risky for audiences to accept because of a fear of being considered problematic abroad. 
For these reasons, the Dance Panel rejected several avant-garde dance artists, and even 
considered them boring. In the first place, racial prejudice among African-American 
artists, who later served as cultural diplomats, was a common scenario. To illustrate, in 
the 1940s and ‘50s African-American artists like Alvin Ailey shared in his autobiography 
that dancers of color were discriminated against because “their feet weren’t shaped right 
or because their legs wouldn’t turn out correctly…” The people who directed major ballet 
and modern dance companies “coldly rejected, and broke the hearts of many” talented 
African-American dancers.185 On the other hand, the Dance Panel often criticized and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid., 94. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Torkom Movsesiyan 
! %'!
rejected another African-American modern dancer, Katherine Dunham, for the “overt 
sexuality of her dances.”186 
     Although survival for African-American dancers was harsh, the civil rights movement 
in the U.S. increased and became known abroad. Consequently, the Dance Panel decided 
to send African-American dance artists overseas. Hence, a modern dance company, led 
by Carmen de Lavallade and Alvin Ailey, became the first African-American dance 
group to be sponsored by the U.S. Department of State. Alvin Ailey’s dance company 
toured Africa and Asia, specifically Japan and Vietnam. Finally, the Japanese raved at 
Ailey’s performances, “The dancing on the stage, as the program went on, demolished 
the barriers between countries, forced us to forget all the stuff about race, color, creed, 
etc…”187 Because of its success overseas, ANTA approved Ailey’s dance company for a 
second tour, but not until 1962. The State Department terminated ANTA in 1967. 
     Besides representation of modern dance, tap, Native-American, and avant-garde dance 
companies, the Dance Panel decided to send ballet dance companies abroad, namely, to 
the Soviet Union. The American Ballet Theatre was the first dance company to be sent to 
the Soviet Union, after which both the Joffrey Ballet and the New York City Ballet 
followed. It is important to note that the State Department sent American ballet 
companies to the Soviet Union to show appreciation towards Russian culture through 
Russian ballet. In like manner, by dong so the U.S. wanted to show the Soviets that “the 
U.S. could not only produce dancers as technically accomplished as any in the USSR, but 
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also ballets that surpassed in sophistication and complexity anything seen on a Soviet 
stage.”188 
     While American ballet companies toured all over the world, winning admiration and 
elevating America’s image through ballet, Igor Moiseyev’s ballet dance company was 
sent on a tour to France and Great Britain as sponsored by the Soviet Union Ministry of 
Culture. The sponsorship of Moiseyev’s ballet was first proposed at a meeting in Geneva 
in July 1955, mediated by the U.S., France, and the United Kingdom. Dance became the 
most exported cultural commodity during the Cold War. In addition, cultural exchange 
extended to “science, technology, agriculture, medicine, public health, radio and 
television, motion pictures, exhibition, publications, government, youth, athletics, 
scholarly research, culture, and tourism.”189 Finally, after a series of negotiations in 
Geneva in 1955, led by Soviet Minister of Culture, Nikolai Mikhailov, the U.S. and 
USSR signed and exchange agreement in 1958 that made possible Moiseyev’s ballet 
company to tour the U.S. 190 Unlike a traditional ballet choreography, Moiseyev’s 
choreographies displayed a theatricalized version of Russian folk dances that included 
major ballet movements. 
      In reciprocity, Moiseyev’s ballet company made its U.S. debut in 1958 storming 
several major cities: New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. 
In 1958, the Dance Magazine reports, “And there is the strong non-dance element—the 
indisputable excitement that comes of seeing Russians—real people—laughing, dancing, 
waving. For forty years the doors have been shut. We have known Soviet citizens only by 
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hearsay.”191 Similarly to earlier description of misperceptions of America and its people 
by the Soviets and other countries, the statement explains that Moiseyev’s U.S. tour 
helped break down American ideologies of the Soviets. Even dance critic John Martin, 
who once had been against cultural exchanges through the performing arts under 
Eisenhower’s Emergency Fund in 1954, became impressed by Moiseyev’s ballet 
performance. To illustrate, John Martin concluded that the outcomes of Moiseyev’s 
performance were grandiose “not only to international relations, but also to artistic 
exchange.”192  
     Perhaps the most important statement of all in regards to Moiseyev’s U.S. tour as a 
cultural exchange was that of a note in the dance program in Philadelphia: “It is our 
earnest wish that this program will be the beginning of an enlightenment which will 
enable our Governments to create an atmosphere which will enable the U.S. and Russia 
to live in Peace.”193 After Moiseyev’s U.S. tour, the Soviet Union expressed an interest in 
sending another major ballet company, known as the Bolshoi Ballet, in 1959, which 
similarly to Moiseyev’s company dazzled with its performances throughout the U.S.  
      The State Department decided to extend its array of ballet dance companies by 
sending on a Soviet Union tour the Joffrey Ballet Company, which was a small ballet 
ensemble that traveled extensively to the Middle East as well. The director of this 
company was a ballet dancer, named Robert Joffrey. From the end of 1962 to early 1963 
the company traveled extensively to Jordan, Egypt, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, 
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India, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.194 Joffrey’s ballet was the first ballet company 
to perform in Amman, Jordan, in 1962; therefore, Jordanians had never seen ballet prior 
to the Joffrey Ballet’s visit in their country. What’s more, the Jordanian press reported 
that the Joffrey Ballet made an enormous impression on the Arab audience. In like 
manner, the State Department acknowledged that the performances had a significant role 
and purpose in this cultural exchange. Consequently, the company’s tour in Syria was a 
smashing success, where an ecstatic Syrian critic noted that although Lebanon has 
witnessed some of the finest performances of ballet from France, the United Kingdom, 
and Russia, the Joffrey Ballet had offered the Syrian audience what no other ballet 
company had before.195 
The ups and downs of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy Budgets: Severe Cutbacks in Funds  
     As has been noted, the U.S. Department of State invested heavily in cultural 
diplomacy during the Cold War to project anti-Communism and secure hegemonic 
solidarity. In 1978, during President Jimmy Carter’s administration, the Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), both 
responsible for any cultural activities, were combined into a newly formed agency, best 
known as the U.S. International Communication Agency (USICA). However, during the 
Reagan administration USICA was renamed USIA.196 As of October 1, 1999, ECA, the 
Bureau for Public Affairs (PA), and the Office for International Information Programs 
(IIP) have been administered by a new position, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy 
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and Public Affairs. 197 
      Unfortunately, with the end of the Cold War, the State Department decided to reduce 
the size of government, programs, staff and its resources. According to the Consolidation 
of the USIA into the State Department Report, the International Visitor Program (IVP), 
designed to bring cultural exchange participants to the U.S. from various parts of the 
world, is in need of “not just rhetorical support, but additional financial resources as 
well.”198 Indeed, IVP is one of the best governmental programs that exposes foreigners to 
the values, tradition, and culture of U.S. society. Needless to say, IVP plays a pivotal role 
in breaking down barriers, ideologies, and clichés of U.S. culture abroad.  
      Although in the 1990s the U.S. Congress approved additional funds for USIA related 
to cultural exchange activities in Eastern Europe to project freedom and democracy after 
the fall of communism, USIA staff and resources experienced major cutbacks. Needless 
to say, by the late 1990s USIA budget cuts became 33%, decreasing its staff by 29%.199 
Consequently, in 1999 the USIA was consolidated into the U.S. State Department. Staff 
was not only reduced in the U.S., but also overseas, especially in U.S. embassies, 
consulates, cultural centers, libraries, universities, etc. Therefore, these budget cuts had a 
severe impact on cultural activities abroad creating a crisis for cultural diplomacy. 
What’s more, slashing cultural programs through budget cuts undermines the potential of 
cultural diplomacy, that is to say, keeping cross-cultural communication alive is 
imperative to effective diplomacy. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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      The Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations Bill is responsible for the funding 
of public diplomacy, which budget is less than eight percent of the State Department’s 
total budget.200 The State Department’s budget for public diplomacy for fiscal year 2003 
was $600 million out of which 40% was allocated for educational and cultural 
activities.201 From 1978 the Office of Citizen Exchanges/Cultural Programs, also known 
as the Arts America, was responsible for cultural programs, but in 1997 it was closed. 
The cultural activities budget cuts limited the tours of performing artists, art exhibitions, 
panelists on the arts and literature, and cultural attachés. For example, in 1993, “the Arts 
America office consisted of a personnel of 30 and a budget of $1.6 million; in addition, 
$3.2 million in salaries and opening costs.”202  
     However, starting in 1997, personnel decreased to three, including the allocation of 
staff and $1.2 million in program funds to the Office of Citizen Exchanges under the 
State Department.203 Similarly, from 1995 to 2001 the number of ECA-sponsored cultural 
exchange participants decreased from 45,000 to 29,000.204 Equally important is the 
decline of foreign students in U.S. colleges and universities because of strict U.S. visa 
requirements. For these reasons, there has been an increase in the number of students 
attending European Union and Australian universities. In 2004, there has been a decline 
with 2.4 percent in the number of U.S. enrolled foreign students, compared to 1971.205 
Finally, the economic losses from the decline of foreign student enrollment in 2003 were 
$300 million. 206 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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      The Cultural Programs Division monitors U.S. State Department funds for American 
artists at international venues, a public-private partnership that includes the National 
Endowment for the Arts, The Pew Charitable Trusts, and the Rockefeller Foundation, 
which enables financial support for U.S. representation at festivals by artists.207 The 
Kennedy Center provided funds for jazz tours; yet, funding for the arts is primarily 
oriented towards U.S. educational and cultural institutions as opposed to the performing 
arts. Therefore, financial support for the performing arts in U.S. cultural diplomacy by 
the State Department has diminished.  
U.S. Cultural Diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa 
      Cultural diplomacy funds from the State Department are miniscule compared to the 
Cold War, when America used the performing arts as a weapon to counteract 
communism. Yet, cultural diplomacy activities towards the Middle East and North Africa 
still take place under various initiatives. For example, in 2004 the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO) published a report on recent U.S. public diplomacy efforts, 
where the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) faced serious challenges in the 
Middle East. In 1999, BBG became the independent body of international broadcasting 
through Arabic language television, the Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio Farda in 
Iran.  
      Although BBG shares the State Department’s annual budget of a little more than one 
billion dollars, insufficient public diplomacy resources, lack of foreign language 
proficiency among foreign service officers, and projecting diplomacy only towards the 
Arab elites are some of the challenges that hinder BBG’s efficacy. In addition, there have 
been insufficient personnel, and a lack of database with information on the number of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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exchange participants. Because of insufficient funds, ECA has not been able to provide 
BBG with accurate information on exchange participants either. Providing feedback on 
exchange participants helps estimate the progress and effectiveness of BBG. What is 
compelling here is that according to the GAO report, neither the State Department not 
BBG have “systematically and comprehensively been measuring progress toward the 
goals of reaching broader audiences and increasing the publics’ understanding of the U.S. 
To sum up, BBG has shown inefficiency in its mission in the Middle East because of 
insufficient funding from the State Department.208 
      In another instance, in 2004, the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy (ACCD) 
at the State Department, went on a mission to Muscat, Cairo and London to investigate 
the role of arts and culture in foreign policy. Most importantly, ACCD’s agenda was to 
explore the possibilities of U.S. government-sponsored arts and cultural programs, and 
how cultural diplomacy can improve America’s image in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Consequently, ACCD concluded that the U.S. image could not have been worse, 
specifically, hostility towards U.S. foreign policy and politics. Equally important, ACCD 
discovered that there was a lack of literary cultural exchanges, namely, literature works 
and translation of Arab literature in English and vice versa. For example, while in Egypt 
ACCD found out that compared to the total of 185,000 works translated in English in 
2004, only 874 of them were literary. This shortage of literary work translation leads to 
“cultural cross-fertilization.”209 Hence, according to the 2002 Arab Human Development 
Report issued by the UN pointed that, “Translation is one of the most important channels !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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for the dissemination of information and communication with the rest of the world.”210 
       During a luncheon in Muscat, Cairo, ACCD met with a photographer from the 
Omani Fine Arts Society, who explained that American prejudices towards the Muslim 
world are cultural, where Muslims are seen as backward. However, Muslim prejudice 
towards the U.S. is political because of America’s foreign policy in favor of Israel.211 
Above all, because of cultural diplomacy budget cuts on behalf of the U.S. State 
Department, “Arabs only see U.S. political machinations; hence, there is no cultural 
counterweight to [U.S] foreign policy.” 212 In addition, the luncheon discussed attempts 
on behalf of the Egyptian Ministry of Culture to reach the U.S. Department in regards to 
reciprocal invitations of American and Egyptian dance troupes, singers, musicians, visual 
artists, and stage directors. Conversely, one of the Egyptian officials at the Ministry of 
Culture explained that there was a lack of communication between the State Department 
and Egyptian cultural institutions, which is a direct result of no U.S. cultural presence in 
Egypt.213  
       Because of fear of terrorist threats after September 11, 2001 and severe budget cuts, 
the State Department decided to close down all American libraries in the Middle East and 
North Africa. Instead, the State Department replaced them with American corners, 
reducing the exposure of Arabs to various aspects of U.S. culture. For these reasons, the 
public and press affairs counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi, Olsin-Windecker, 
noted that “it’s not ‘Culture’ with a capital C. That kind of activity over the last 10 years 
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has just about ceased.”214  
     Unlike the Cold War, today the U.S. government has brought few performing artists to 
the Middle East and North Africa. For instance, in Amman, Jordan, the U.S. Embassy has 
brought the Battery Dance Company several times to the Hussein Cultural Center, thanks 
to the assistance of the mayor. 215 The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs at the 
State Department has created the DanceMotion U.S.A. Program that sends several 
American dance companies on a cultural diplomacy tour overseas. In 2012, DanceMotion 
U.S.A., along with its partner, The Broklyn Academy of Music has chosen several 
American dance companies to serve as dance ambassadors in tours to Egypt, Turkey, 
Jordan, Israel, The Palestinian territories, Turkmenstan, Kazakhstan, and the Kyrrgyz 
Republic. Some of these contemporary American dance companies include the Trey 
McIntyre Project, the Sean Curran Company, the Jazz Tap Ensemble, and Rennie Harris 
Puremovement. 216  
     Notwithstanding, there has been little, if any reciprocity, namely, inviting dance artists 
from the Middle East and North Africa to perform in the U.S. Above all, the U.S. 
Department of State has neither sponsored American dance organizations performing the 
dances of the Middle East and North Africa, nor Arabic dance artists who do so. 
Therefore, providing American access to Arab dance artists in the United States and vice 
versa is critical to increasing cross-cultural understanding between the United States and 
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the Middle East and North Africa. Similarly, organized art exhibitions to the Arab world 
today are a far cry from what the State Department used to do during the Cold War.  
     In another example, public affairs officer, Mahoney, at the American Embassy in Abu 
Dhabi, is delighted to provide an opportunity for Islamic clerics to embark on a cultural 
exchange program to the United States. During this exchange program, junior imams 
from the Middle East gave sermons, known as khutbas in the Arabic language, in local 
U.S. mosques. Prior to his visit to the U.S. one of the imams had depicted U.S. culture 
and America as negative, however, after the exchange program in which he participated, 
he realized that American values are no different than any other values of countries 
around the world. 217 What’s more, after his U.S. visit, the imam stressed that when one 
thinks of Americans and their culture, one should differentiate between U.S. foreign 
policy and the everyday people of the U.S. The imam also shared that he had been 
welcomed in both U.S. churches and U.S. synagogues, when giving speeches on Islam, 
being a peaceful religion. Thus, this powerful example elucidates the importance of 
cultural exchange programs as a diplomatic tool in dispelling stereotypical views of U.S. 
culture, values, and traditions.  
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                                                                 CHAPTER V 
                                                    U.S.-EGYPT RELATIONS 
                                        
Demographic Data of Egypt 
      Egypt is located in the northeastern part of the African continent, bordering with the 
Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, Libya, the Gaza Strip, Sudan, and Israel. With an 
increasing population of over 82 million people, today Egypt is one of the most populated 
countries in the world.218  
Figure 1"*)!!!!!!!!!Cairo is the capital of Egypt with a population of over 11 million. As of 2010, the 
country’s life expectancy rate at birth is 75.5, whereas its infant mortality rate is 22.0.220 
The country’s ethnic diversity includes Egyptians, Bedouins, Berbers, Coptic Christians, 
Nubians, Greeks, Jews, Italians, and French. As Egyptian dialects vary according to 
regions, Arabic is the country’s official Semitic language. Egypt’s main religion is Islam, 
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where the predominant sect is that of Sunni. As the largest population consists of 
Muslims, eight to ten percent are Christians, Coptics constitute the largest Christian 
population. Egypt’s Jewish community is miniscule. The country’s economy 
predominantly relies on its agricultural sector; Egypt has been historically known for its 
cotton industry and also tourism. 221 
History of Egypt: From the Birth of Ancient Egyptian Civilization to Modern Egypt 
      Egypt takes pride in its rich history that dates back to the Predynastic Period circa 
5300 to 2950 BC. The following is the chronology of the Egyptian civilization: Early 
Dynastic Period circa 2950-2613 BC, Old Kingdom circa 2613-2160BC, First 
Intermediate Period circa 2160-2055 BC, Middle Kingdom circa 2055-1640, Second 
Intermediate Period circa 1640-1550 BC, New Kingdom circa 1550-1069, Third 
Intermediate Period circa 1069-715 BC, and the Late Period circa 715-332 BC.222 
According to Jason Thompson, the ancient Egyptians developed “political unity, 
kingship, writing, monumental architecture, agriculture, large-scale irrigation, modes of 
artistic expression, and social organization.”223   
      Egypt’s history continues with the Arab conquest from 639 to 642 by Amr Ibn Al As, 
followed by the Ayyubi Dynasty that ended in 1250. Afterwards the Mamluks controlled 
Egyptian provinces until 1516, when the Ottoman Empire took control over Egypt until 
1805. In 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Egypt until the French defeated the British. 
In 1805, an Albanian commander-in-chief, named Muhammad Ali, became the viceroy of 
Egypt until his death in 1849. Muhammad Ali banned professional dancers in Egypt in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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1834. In 1882, England gained control over the Egyptian government. In addition, 
England proclaimed Egypt a protectorate in 1922, and recognized Egypt’s sovereignty 
under the rule of King Fuad. Following the calamity of World War II, Egypt joined the 
United Nations, and brought into question the possible withdrawal of British troops from 
the country that had occupied Egypt for twenty years.  
The Creation of Modern Egypt 
      The Arab Republic of Egypt was founded on June 18, 1953, along with its first 
president, Muhammed Naguib, a former Egyptian general. 224 In 1954 Lieutenant Gamal 
Abd al-Nassar became Egypt’s second president. By the end of June1954, the British 
troops withdrew from the Suez Canal through an evacuation agreement, signed in 
October 1954. On July 1956, President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal.225 However, 
in late 1956, a military conflict between Egypt, Britain, France, and Israel broke out, 
known in history as the Suez Canal Crisis. The United States, the Soviet Union, and the 
United Nations condemned and pressured Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw. Even 
though the Suez Canal Crisis was resolved, it reopened the crisis between Israel and 
Egypt.226 
      As the prominent voice of Arab nationalism, President Nasser became the charismatic 
leader of the Arab world, mesmerizing the Arab populace in the Middle East and North 
Africa. President Nasser represented not only unity among Arab nations, but also, 
independence from colonial powers. Perhaps Nasser’s greatest ally was Syria because 
both countries shared the idea of pan-Arabism. Both countries advocated for Arab unity, 
supporting Arabic countries operating under the auspices of a single unity, known as the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
224 Ibid., 125-128. 
225 Ibid., 130. 
226 Ibid.,298-299. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Torkom Movsesiyan 
! '*!
United Arabic Republic (UAR), originally founded on February 1st, 1958.227 Among the 
Arab countries that welcomed UAR were Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen. The 
Headquarters of the UAR were located in Cairo. In like manner, Palestinians also 
embraced the UAR, especially after hostilities with the Jewish state of Israel had 
occupied Palestinian territories. The UAR was short-lived, and ended in 1961.228 
      As has been noted, the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956 increased tensions between Egypt 
and Israel, which lasted until 1978, when the Egyptian President, Sadat and the Israeli 
President, Begin, signed an agreement adhering to the Camp David Peace Accords. The 
Camp David Peace Accords were a series of diplomatic efforts, led by U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter with Egypt and Israel that lasted for less than two years. The United States 
served as the mediator between the two countries that had been at war for three decades. 
According to Shibley Telhami, the accords not only proposed bilateral agreements 
between Israel and Egypt, but also served as a platform for “Palestinian autonomy on the 
West Bank and in Gaza—non-Egyptian territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 
war.”229  
History of U.S.-Egypt Relations 
      Egypt’s diplomatic relations with the U.S. began in 1922. In its relationship with the 
U.S., Egypt plays a strategic role in the economic stability of the Middle East and North 
Africa. In addition, as a U.S. partner, Egypt promotes peace, and helps counteract 
terrorism. According to the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the U.S. Department of 
State, the U.S. has exported to Egypt wheat, corn, mineral fuel, oil, machinery, aircraft, 
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iron and steel products. Egyptian exports to the U.S. include apparel, natural gas, oil, 
fertilizers, textile coverings, and agricultural products.230 In 1967, as Egypt’s debt 
reached two billion dollars, under President Lyndon Johnson the U.S. government 
stopped the shipments of surplus American wheat. In 1977, Egypt face a stark financial 
crisis, when its foreign debt continued to grow.231  
      In 1981, Hosni Mubarak became Egypt’s next president and was reelected in 1987. 
During his presidency, Egypt’s relation to its neighboring Arab countries was restored, 
namely, Egypt’s readmittance to the Arab League in 1988, including Cairo being again 
its headquarters. As an U.S. ally, during Mubarak’s regime, Egypt played a pivotal role 
both in denouncing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and later in the Israeli-
Palestinian peace accords from 1993-1994.232 Despite Egyptian support for the U.S. 
during the Mubarak regime, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 did not win Egyptian 
approval, especially, when the Egyptian government allowed public demonstrations 
against it.233  
      U.S. invasion of Iraq decimated the U.S. image in the Middle East, including Egypt, 
where anti-Americanism and Islamic fundamentalism have been on the rise. Although the 
majority of Egyptians are in favor of democracy, according to a Gallop poll, when asked 
if Americans were serious about establishing democratization in Egypt, 63% of Egyptians 
disagreed.234 Unfortunately, in 2008, that percentage increased to 75%. In like manner, 
according to a Pew poll taken in 2011, the Arab Spring did not change Egyptian public !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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opinion over U.S. favorability, decreasing it to 17% in 2010 compared to 30% in 2006.235 
       A pivotal point in U.S.-Egypt relations was President Obama’s speech in Cairo as 
part of his public diplomacy efforts, addressing U.S.-Middle East relations but not 
specifically addressing U.S.-Egypt affairs. Moreover, Obama’s speech discussed political 
freedom but not democracy. Consequently, in November 2009, in a speech by Secretary 
of State, Hillary Clinton, she envisioned the promotion of human rights, education, 
economic development, and the support of civil society. Unlike the Bush administration 
that prioritized economic reform and military assistance in U.S.-Egypt relations, the 
Obama administration focused on soft power multilateral approach to international 
relations versus unilateral. For example, when President Obama authorized a military 
intervention in Libya, it was through a U.N. Security Council resolution. 
      Mubarak’s regime has been known for fraud and violence, namely, beginning with 
the elections in 1995, when although the National Democratic Party won the votes, 
Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court noted that parliamentary elections were not 
“properly supervised.”236 As a result, Mubarak assured the Egyptian people that the next 
elections would be fair and democratic. Nevertheless, the 2002 elections thwarted 
Muslim Brotherhood candidates. Similarly, an anti-Mubarak movement rose again in 
Egypt after rumors about Mubarak’s poor health in 2010, and in early 2011 mass 
demonstrations took place in the streets of Cairo, following the fall of Tunisian President, 
Ben Ali. Notwithstanding, because of large protests in Tahrir Square, Cairo against 
Mubarak’s corrupt regime, and violence against Egyptian civilians, President Obama 
turned to President Mubarak to commit to democratic values, such as not to harm !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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peaceful protestors in Cairo. However, Obama did not call for Mubarak to resign from 
power. The events in Cairo became known as the Egyptian Revolution. 
      In February 2011, Mubarak resigned and was replaced with a Muslim Brotherhood-
nurtured President, Mohammad Morsi. His recent election brought uncertainty in U.S.-
Egypt relations, namely, with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and the military both 
increasing its influence on all aspects of the government. According to Jeremy Sharp, a 
Middle Eastern Affairs specialist, the Muslim Brotherhood has gained much support from 
the Egyptian people because of its emphasis on “social services, party discipline and 
organization, the broad popular appeal to Islam, and its history of opposition to 
Mubarak’s regime.”237 In addition, Egypt’s economy has weakened; for example, Egypt’s 
annual budget deficit is estimated to be from $26 billion to $31 billion.238 Similar to 
Israel, the U.S. government has been concerned over Egypt-Israeli relations, namely, 
anti-Semitic attitude that stems from the Muslim Brotherhood. To illustrate, in 2010, 
President Morsi used anti-Jewish rhetoric, comparing Jews to “the descendants of apes 
and pigs.”239  
      It is important to note that the Camp David Peace Accords put in place the framework 
for a strong alliance between the United States and Egypt that lasted for many decades. 
Although the accords achieved peace between Israel and Egypt, the latter was criticized 
for allowing Israel to occupy the West bank and Gaza, which left unresolved the creation 
of a possible Palestinian state. Furthermore, it could be argued that Israel sacrificed the 
Sinai Peninsula for peace with Egypt, yet, “Egypt may be Israel’s enemy in any case.”240 
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Even though Egypt was removed from the Arab League and it was not granted economic 
aid from the Arab states, it became the recipient of both economic and military aid from 
the United States.  
      U.S. Congress has approved economic and military aid to Egypt as an investment in 
regional stability, as a direct result of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in March 1979 at 
Camp David. To illustrate, in fiscal year 2012, the U.S. bilateral aid to Egypt totaled 
$1.55 billion: $1.3 billion in military aid and $220 million in economic aid.241 In addition, 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee in Washington allocated $450 million from the 
Economic Support Fund (ESF) to compensate for “Egypt’s bilateral debt to the U.S.” in 
exchange for Egypt’s adherence to “a fiscal stabilization program,” as prescribed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, as of December 2012, the ESF’s $450 
million has been placed on hold.242 According to Jason Thompson, U.S. economic and 
military aid to Egypt totals more than $71.6 billion, making Egypt the second largest U.S. 
aid recipient after Israel.243 
       Unfortunately, in the eyes of most Egyptians, U.S. hard power as in providing Egypt 
with U.S. military aid, has hindered U.S. soft power. Although the U.S. government 
considers Egypt to be the pillar of the Arab world, the Egyptian people have expressed 
their disenchantment for America’s long support of Mubarak’s corrupt regime. What’s 
more, Egyptians consider U.S. military aid a free pass for the Egyptian government to 
suppress the voices of the Egyptians, who long for democracy. As seen in the Egyptian 
revolution in 2011, the Mubarak regime used military weapons, provided for by U.S. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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military aid that do not justify America’s support for Egyptian democracy. To illustrate, 
Cynthia Schneider reported that the U.S. government “participated, even if indirectly in 
the crackdown on the revolution, importing weapons that were used on Egyptian 
protesters.”244 For these reasons, many Egyptians including a female Egyptian 
Presidential candidate, Bothaina Kamel, expressed disapproval of U.S. foreign policy to 
Egypt. Bothaina Kamel refused to accept an award for which she was nominated by the 
U.S. Department of State in 2011, because she could not “accept an award stained with 
blood of the martyrs.”245 Finally, even though Egypt continues to be the second recipient 
of U.S. military and economic aid in the world, the U.S. government remains uncertain 
and unsure about the stability of its bilateral relations with Egypt. 
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                                                            CHAPTER VI      
                                                         RAQS SHARQI 
Raqs Sharqi: An Important but Neglected Component of Egyptian Culture. 
        Dance is a universal language that represents every culture of the globe; most 
importantly, dance is one of the many enriching aspects of culture. The dances of the 
Middle East and North Africa have fascinated many people from all facets of life. Every 
region of the Middle East and North Africa is known for its individual and distinctive 
folk dance forms. Each and every folk dance depicts various aspects of people’s daily 
lives. For example, basrawi, a folk dance from the Basra area of southern Iraq depicts the 
lives of fishermen through acrobatic movements. The tahtib is a martial arts dance of 
Egypt that shows the combating skills of men. In reciprocity, in an Egyptian cane dance, 
raqs alassaya, women imitate the combatative skills of the tahtib dance that is performed 
only by men. In another unisex Egyptian folk dance, fella or fellah, performed in Upper 
Egypt, a man looks for love. The dabke is also a folk dance of the Levant that can be seen 
from Palestine to Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. In Turkey, a Turkish Rom folk dance, 
known as sule kule, represents Romany culture with an urban karsilama rhytm of 9/8, and 
depicts the lives of poor Roma girls in a neighborhood in Istanbul. This list of Middle 
Eastern and North African folk dances is extensive but not exhaustive.  
Historical Background of Raqs Sharqi 
      Raqs Sharqi is a unisex folk dance that represents the lives of Arab men and women, 
and can be best seen in Egypt. Raqs Sharqi elucidates the joy and happiness of life 
through dance. For these reasons, in some parts of Lebanon, Raqs Sharqi is often called 
raqs alfarrah, literally translated from Arabic into English as dance of happiness. The 
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etymology of the term—Raqs Sharqi derives from the Arabic language, where raqs 
stands for dance and sharq for East. Therefore, its literal translation from Arabic into 
English is Eastern dance. The term Eastern dance is often mistakenly associated with 
Chinese, Japanese, Korean and other Eastern dance forms. For these reasons, it is 
important to distinguish that what is geographically known as the East is divided into 
Near East, Middle East, and Far East. Although according to the lexicon of geography 
Egypt is located in North Africa, scholars and politicians often refer to Egypt as a country 
of the Middle East.  
      Dancers often refer to Raqs Sharqi as Oriental dance or Middle Eastern dance; 
however, both of these terms are plausible. To illustrate, the adjective oriental derives 
from the noun, Orientalism, a derogatory term, coined by Western European colonial 
powers. The late Egyptian scholar, Edward Said, describes Orientalism as a Western 
European colonial distortion and romanticization of the Middle East and North Africa, 
attempting to portray Muslim culture as backward and exotic. Furthermore, Said 
elucidates that “the Orient was overvalued for its pantheism, its spirituality, its stability, 
its longevity, its primitivity, and so forth.”246  
      Similar to Said’s definition of orientalism, there have been misinterpretations of Raqs 
Sharqi as portrayed by Western European Orientalists such as Gustave Flaubert, George 
William Curtis and others. These individuals traveled to the Middle East and North 
Africa to depict Muslims and Arabs as backward and exotic sexual beasts in order to 
“titillate, educate, and ultimately reassert the superiority of [their] own ideologies to 
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[their] own people: white, bourgeois, American readers.”247  
      Equally important, the term Oriental dance, serves as a conundrum when 
interchanged with Raqs Sharqi because it covers a broad variety of Asian dance styles, 
such as Japanese, Chinese, Indonesian, and other East Asian genres. In like manner, the 
terminology – Middle Eastern dance, is ambiguous because geographically it pertains 
more broadly to the Middle East, but not to a specific Middle Eastern country. 
Nonetheless, the term Middle Eastern dance excludes Egypt, which is located in 
northeastern Africa. 
      Raqs Sharqi executes articulations of the torso, pelvis, abdominal muscles, hands, 
arms, head, and most importantly, the hips as the main body movements. As of today, 
Raqs Sharqi remains the most popular dance in Egypt, and that is why the country is 
often referred to as the pillar of Raqs Sharqi. Yet, there is no compelling evidence that 
reveals the true origins of Raqs Sharqi in terms of place and time because this folk dance 
dates back to thousands of years ago. Likewise, it is hard to estimate whether or not Raqs 
Sharqi is the oldest dance on earth. However, the dance is unarguably one of the oldest in 
the world. Hence, this conundrum has proliferated many speculations about the origins of 
Raqs Sharqi; namely, there are assumptions that the dance dates back to pre-historic 
times, when women imitated the undulation movements, used during their childbirths, 
according to Morroco’s personal observation in 1967.248 In another instance, others have 
speculated that Raqs Sharqi was first practiced by priestesses to worship Goddesses or in 
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relation to fertility and love rituals.249 To reiterate, because there have not been any 
records of evidence to justify the above assumptions, the origins of Raqs Sharqi have 
been misinterpreted by the West. 
      In the West, Raqs Sharqi is popularly known as la danse du ventre, which translated 
from French into English means belly dance. However, this terminology is erroneous 
because first, Raqs Sharqi includes not only the abdominal muscles, that is to say, the 
belly, but also other body parts such as the hands, the torso, and the hips. Second,  the 
term, belly dance, was coined by the architect of the Chicago World’s Fair, Sol Bloom, 
in 1893 that included dancers of the Middle East and North Africa. Sol Bloom decided to 
name it belly dance in order to titillate the attendees of the fair.250 It is important to note 
that this happened during the Mid-Victorian era, when exposing any body parts was 
considered risqué; in other words, indecent or improper. For example, when referring to 
the following body parts – arms and legs, the Mid-Victorians used only the word, limbs. 
In like manner, during the Mid-Victorian era a new dance had emerged, known as the 
waltz, in which when performed by a man and a woman, the male dance partner was not 
allowed to place his hand below the waist of the female dance partner. Dancing the waltz 
otherwise was considered salacious by the Mid-Victorians, because it contradicted “the 
formalities and corporeal distance,” as seen in Victorian courtship rituals.251  
      As a result, watching Middle Eastern or North African dancers perform in a two-piece 
costume, exposing the abdominal muscles, and calling them belly dancers caused a 
burning sensation among the Mid-Victorians. At that time people would pay anything to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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see what they called “the hoochie-coochie,” referring to belly dance, as performed by 
Little Egypt at the Chicago World’s Fair in 1893.252 Accordingly, the owner of the fair, 
Sol Bloom, profited greatly from it. One can imagine what the Mid-Victorians made out 
of belly dance! Nonetheless, the event of the Chicago Fair gave birth to the Western 
misconception of Raqs Sharqi that continues to prevail in Western society. 
Westernization and Modernization of Raqs Sharqi 
       In the West, the media along with Hollywood has mislabeled Raqs Sharqi as the 
sexual, exotic, and streaptise-like belly dance that led to iconic (mis)representations of 
the dance, being the emblem of the Middle East and North Africa. For example, 
Hollywood celebrities like Hedy Lamarr, Rita Hayworth, and Theda Bara, have reenacted 
misinterpretations of Raqs Sharqi in the movie, Arabian Nights, and the Broadway 
musical, Kismet, where the average Middle Eastern and North African woman is seen as 
exotic. 253 Such erroneous beliefs of Raqs Sharqi have stirred anger and frustration among 
Muslims in the Arab world. Hence, such rhetoric belies this sweeping generalization of 
Raqs Sharqi. Because of these Western assumptions of Raqs Sharqi being associated with 
sexuality and striptease both academic scholars and the general public have questioned its 
legitimacy in the world. 
      In another sense, the Westernization and modernization of Raqs Sharqi as a sexual 
dance empowered thousands of American women during the feminist movement in the 
1970s. Furthermore, during that time women saw belly dance “as a symbol of personal 
and sexual liberation,” namely because in the 1970s the female body was often rejected 
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in a hegemonic patriarchal society. 254As women advocated for feminism and became 
fascinated with belly dance, feminists in the U.S. created the “belly dance movement.”255 
As a result, the belly dance movement united many American females, including those 
who began to perform and teach belly dance classes, workshops, and seminars in the U.S. 
In addition, American women traveled for the first time to Egypt and other places to 
attend Raqs Sharqi classes. In reciprocity, native Egyptian dance artists followed suit and 
traveled to the U.S. to teach Raqs Sharqi. Even without the support of the U.S. 
Department of State, this reciprocity enabled cultural diplomacy through Raqs Sharqi that 
united, therefore, strengthened many dance communities around the world. 
From The Golden Era of Raqs Sharqi to its Decline in Egypt 
      Professional dancers in Egypt have been performing Raqs Sharqi for a long time. As 
has been noted, the Westernization of Raqs Sharqi, known as belly dance, became an 
integral part of the entertainment industry in Egypt and many parts of the world. 
According to Andrew Hammond, the export of Middle Eastern and North African 
dancers to Britain, France, and America began in 1851, mainly in exhibitions and 
Hollywood productions.256 As the British occupation of Egypt began in 1882, British and 
Ottoman ruling classes and other foreigners that visited Cairo became the main clientele 
in many public venues that hired Egyptian Raqs Sharqi dancers to entertain them. An 
early twentieth century, dancer and club owner of Qibtiya and Syrian origin, Badia 
Masabni, opened the famous Opera Casino in the 1930s in downtown Cairo. In 1933, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
254 Ibid. 
255 Najwa Adra, “ Belly Dance: An Urban Folk Dance,” in Belly Dance: Orientalism, Transnationalism, 
and Harem Fantasy, ed. Anthony Shay and Barabara Sellers-Young (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 
Inc.), 45. 
256 Andrew Hammond, “The Belly Dance: A Reinvented Arab Groove,” in Popular Culture in the Arab 
World: Arts, Politics, and Media (New York: The American University in Cairo Press), 190-191. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Torkom Movsesiyan 
! (#!
famous Muhammad Ali Street, named after the Egyptian ruler, became the Cairene 
version of Broadway. Badia Masabni produced classical Egyptian dancers of the finest 
caliber during the golden era, prior to 1952: Tahia Carioca, Samia Gamal, Naima Akef, 
Laila al-Gazairiya, Nelly Mazloum, Kitty and many others. An Egyptian dancer, Hikmat 
Fahmy, performed for Hitler and Musolini. 257 
      Because of a riot in Cairo in 1952, Badia Masabni’s club was turned into ashes by 
mobs, who allegedly accused her of being a spy, catering to British secret agents.258 A 
very popular tourist area, the Pyramids Road, became an arena of nightclubs, cabarets, 
and casino that provided the platform for many Egyptian dancers to perform in the late 
1970s. The Pyramids Road in Egypt became an entertainment Mecca for many Persian 
Gulf tourists that increased revenues from tourism. However, in 1977, there were several 
attacks against dancers and clubs. Around that time, Egypt’s highest paid and most 
famous Raqs Sharqi dancer, Fifi Abdou, became successful. Afterwards, many other 
Egyptian dancers followed suit; to illustrate, Dina, who comes from a very educated 
family, and has an academic degree in philosophy. While pursuing her degree, Dina 
joined the [Mahmoud] Reda Troupe in the early 1970s, and still remains one of Egypt’s 
leading belly dancers.  
      Throughout the years, the highest caliber of Egyptian dancers catered to the field of 
diplomacy, when many performed for dignitaries like Henry Kissinger, Presidents Carter, 
George Bush, Prince Charles, and Camilla Parker-Bowles. 259Yet, because of negative 
colonial attitudes, and attacks on dancers that stem from the rising influence of Islamic 
fundamentalism throughout the Middle East, including Egypt, Raqs Sharqi and similar !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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folk dance activities have declined. 
Islamic Java: Islamic Fundamentalism Towards Raqs Sharqi in Egypt 
    As a starting point for this discussion as it pertains to Islamic fundamentalism, let’s 
look at its historical background in Egypt. By 1977, the country’s foreign debt had 
increased tremendously. Because Egypt could not keep up with its interest payments and 
in order to improve the economy, foreign aid from the U.S. was utilized for food 
subsidies. Foreign investment was minimal, if any. As a result of Sadat’s inability to 
continue to pay the subsidies, many riots took place in the streets of Cairo. To illustrate, 
Egyptians burnt down nightclubs, and condemned any signs of foreign influence. At the 
same time, the Camp David Peace accords were signed by the Sadat’s administration, 
however, Sadat was criticized for doing so because the Arab League was sympathetic 
towards Palestinians. The flow of foreign money coming to the country enabled the 
success of businesses owned by the bourgeoisie; yet, it drove the small businesses to 
foreclosures. In like manner, poverty along with the unemployment rate increased, 
driving many Egyptians, including college graduates to look for jobs abroad.260 
     As the country witnessed turmoil, most Egyptians lost faith in their government and 
turned extremely religious. Because of seeking comfort from God, Allah, women’s dress 
code became more conservative, namely, long sleeved dresses along with head veils, 
known as hijabs in Arabic. Men followed suit by wearing authentic Muslim galabiyas or 
dishdashas. Similarly, Islamic organizations opposed Sadat’s administration condemning 
flow of Western capital in the country, and accusing Sadat of being responsible for the 
highest level of corruption that Egypt has ever encountered. It is also important to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
260 Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, “Form Sadat to Mubarak, 1970 to the Present Day,” A History of Egypt: 
From the Arab Conquest to the Present (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 159-161. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Torkom Movsesiyan 
! (%!
mention that by then the Iranian Revolution in Iran, overthrowing the Shah’s regime, had 
taken place, and Islamic fundamentalism swept the entire Middle East, including Egypt.  
    Twenty years later during Mubarak’s regime, several terrorist attacks in 1992 and 1997 
targeted tourists in Egypt. Afterwards, because of increased investment in tourism in the 
Red Sea, Islamic insurgents targeted Israeli tourists as well in 2004 and 2005.261  
     Because Islamic fundamentalism mores regard female dancers as “arousing unlawful 
sexual passion among males, causing fitna,” known as social chaos in Arabic, dance as a 
professional career in Egypt is frowned upon.262 Fundamental Islamists attacking many 
dancers from Afghanistan, Morocco and Egypt are a common scenario, namely, the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo. Therefore, Islamic clergies consider dance in public to be 
one of the highest crimes of all equating it with prostitution. Although dancing in public 
in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan are forbidden and punishable by law, dance is 
desired in many private homes but not advertised.263  
Negative Attitudes Towards Raqs Sharqi in Egypt 
      In the Middle East and North Africa, dance in public is still considered a disreputable 
profession by the elite, and even outlawed in Islamic states like Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
Because of Western misinterpretations of Raqs Sharqi labeling the dance “exotic,” and 
“sexual” that stem from Victorian morality, native and Western choreographers have 
been compelled to develop “acceptable” choreographies that appeal to the middle and 
upper class elite. These polemics towards the folk dances of most Middle Eastern and 
North African countries have developed as a product of post-colonial attitudes.  
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    Throughout history, Egypt has experienced centuries of colonialism: from Greek, 
Persian, Roman, Byzantine, and Ottoman to French and British. The continuing impact of 
colonialism on dance vibrates on Egyptian society. Dr. Shay explains that the Ottomans 
had an enormous impact on the elite class of Egyptian society that prospered from the 
Ottoman period, and continues to resonate in Egypt’s upper class, also known in 
Egyptian Arabic under the Ottoman terminology, efendi.264  
      Because this discussion pertains to colonialism, it is important to differentiate 
Ottoman from British colonial rule. Unlike the British, the Egyptians shared common 
cultural values with the Ottomans such as Islam. In Colonising Egypt, Timothy Mitchell 
argues that the negative attitudes, as illustrated in Egyptian society, are a direct result of 
British colonial rule. Also, Mitchell elucidates that colonialism “refers not simply to the 
establishment of a European presence, but also to the spread of a political order that 
inscribes in the social world a new conception of space, new forms of personhood, and 
new means of manufacturing the experience of the real.”265 He also describes the gist of 
British colonialism as “a new binary order,” where the British attempted to ensure both a 
material and moral order.266 
        Because of Ottoman, French, and British colonialism that penetrated most Middle 
Eastern and North African countries, countries like Turkey, Lebanon, and Egypt among 
many, have adopted “a system of moral values based on nineteenth-century middle class 
European notions.”267 As a result of post colonialism, most Middle Eastern and North 
African countries have adopted a new educational system that incorporated values, 
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designed to nullify traditional folk dances that represent a particular culture, including 
traditional Raqs Sharqi.268 Although colonialism has ended, both the middle and upper 
class in the Middle East and North Africa still prefer to see more respectable dance forms 
like ballet versus traditional folk dances that are an embarrassing display of 
backwardness or old-fashioned. 
     Although the practice of Raqs Sharqi as a profession still exists in Egypt, negative 
attitudes from the elite have pressured both native Egyptian and Western dancers to 
change Egyptian folk dance choreographies. Dr. Shay defines this phenomenon as 
choreophobia. What’s more, choreographers replaced the traditional folk dances with 
theatrical versions along with change of costumes in order for the choreographies to 
appeal to the Westernized elite of Egypt. After Nassers’ revolution in 1952, through 
government support the Egyptian elite westernized and modernized its indigenous dance 
styles. 269 Therefore, the vulgar and déclassé belly dance was immediately replaced by 
modernized Egyptian folk dances, created by a pioneer of Egyptian dance 
choreographies, Mahmoud Reda, who was born during the British colonial rule.  
      Equally important, the Soviets imposed their Communist model on most Central 
Asian nations, and on Egypt as well. For instance, President Nasser had established a 
strong relationship with the Soviets, who projected their communist ideologies on 
Mahmoud Reda’s repertoire of folk dance choreographies. The only way for the Egyptian 
government to sponsor Reda’s folk dance troupe was through the approval of the 
Egyptian government. Because the Egyptian government had rejected the inclusion of 
any traditional or any belly dance movements that the elite finds backward and primitive, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Mahmoud Reda had to sanitize all sexually aggressive movements and replace them with 
hegemonic ones like ballet movements. Hence, Mahmoud Reda adhered to rules, dictated 
by the elite of the Egyptian government that adopted colonial attitudes towards any of the 
Egyptian folk dances. Despite much financial support and grants from the Egyptian 
Ministry of Culture in the 1960s and 1970s for the Reda Troupe, Mahmoud Reda left the 
troupe because of opposition and lack of support from the Egyptian government in the 
years to follow.270 
     Similarly, because of Soviet communist influence on Egypt, the Ministry of Culture in 
Cairo invited Russian experts to teach Egyptian folk dance troupes. Therefore, a former 
Moiseyev company expert, Boris Ramazin, established a well-known Egyptian folk 
dance company, The National Folkloric Troupe, in 1961.271 In other words, the imported 
Russian experts replaced the traditional Egyptian folk dance movements for balletic 
movements as suggested by the Moiseyev’s Ensemble. As of today, traces of Soviet 
balletic forms, perpetrated by Moiseyev, are still present in the choreographies of 
Egyptian state folk dance troupes, known as the Moscow on the [Egyptian] Nile. 
      Another state folk dance company, the El-Nil [The Nile] Folkloric Troupe, was 
sponsored by the Egyptian government to represent the country at the Bicentennial 
Celebration of the Smithsonian Institute in Washington, D.C. in 1975. Yet, the 
Smithsonian folklorists rejected the El-Nil [The Nile] Folkloric Troupe’s participation 
because similarly to the The National Folkloric Troupe in 1961, it did not represent 
authentic Egyptian folk dances. Instead, the Egyptian government-sponsored El-Nil 
Folkloric Troupe had incorporated non-traditional Soviet balletic movements that did not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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represent Egyptian culture.272 The El-Nil Folkloric Troupe toured both the U.S. and 
Europe many times. Even though The El-Nil Folkloric Troupe is known as the best-
received folk dance troupe outside of Egypt, the Cairene audience in Egypt does not 
reflect on its successes abroad because the Egyptian elites regard traditional folk dances 
as primitive and backward.273 In addition, according to the Egyptian Gazette in 1995, 
former Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, projected with his “colonial inspired 
choreophobic” voice that “recent riots in the Imbaba, a district of Cairo, were instigated 
not by radical Islamists but by indecent and troublesome elements of the local district: 
belly dancers [sic] and drummers from the slums.274 
Today’s Raqs Sharqi and Dance Diplomacy Activities in Egypt and the West 
       Cairo serves as a reminder of ongoing post colonialism. Despite the negative colonial 
attitudes and attacks on dancers from Islamic fundamentalists that have caused the 
decline of Raqs Sharqi in Egypt, millions of amateur and professional dancers continue to 
practice this ancient art form all over the world. There are several traditional dances in 
Egypt that are still practiced by both men and women, such as raqs al-shamadan, 
simsimiya, and baladi. In addition, the dabka from the Levant, the haggala of the 
Bedouins in North Africa, al-urda in Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi Bedouin war dance, al-
dahha, the Iraqi dance, al-haywa, al-hasha’a, and andalusi.275 This list of traditional folk 
dances is extensive, but not exhaustive. 
     Former Egyptian Reda Troupe dancer, current dance instructor, and host of the largest 
Raqs Sharqi dance festival in the world, Raqia Hassan, continues the legacy of Raqs 
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Sharqi. Raqia Hassan is the owner of the legendary Ahlan Wa Sahlan dance festival in 
Egypt. This festival has attracted many Russian, South American, Japanese, and North 
American dancers, who gather every year during the summer to celebrate the joy and 
happiness of Raqs Sharqi as they learn and practice it. It is also the enthusiasm of North 
American dancers from both Canada and the United States thanks to which Raqs Sharqi 
still thrives. Many renowned Raqs Sharqi teachers and performers from the West have 
hosted numerous dance festivals, seminars, workshops, and conferences as a diplomatic 
tool to bring the world dance communities together through cultural exchange activities. 
Also, Egyptian dance celebrities like Fifi Abdou, Dina, Raqia Hassan, Tito, Soheir Zaki, 
Mahmoud Reda, Farida Fahmy, and many others are invited on a regular basis to teach 
and perform in the United States. Similarly to the Ahlan Wa Sahlan festival, the United 
States takes pride in hosting its annual Rakkasah dance festival both on the West and the 
East Coast. The International Belly Dance Conference of Canada (IBCC) also hosts an 
annual dance festival that brings thousands of Raqs Sharqi dancers. As the dance is 
exposed to extinction, it is hard to determine whether or not Raqs Sharqi will play an 
important role in cultural diplomacy in U.S.-Egypt relations. 
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                                                        CHAPTER VII 
                                          DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
Testing the Hypothesis 
     Throughout U.S. history, dance has been an effective diplomatic tool in cultural 
diplomacy, namely, during the Cold War. Although minimal efforts to support cultural 
diplomacy exist today in the U.S., the U.S. Department of State’s sponsorship of dance 
diplomacy is limited to dance companies that project mostly American dance. Therefore, 
the U.S. Department of State has expressed little, if any interest, in sending dance 
companies other than American dance overseas in political hot spots such as Egypt. As 
has been noted in chapter IV, in the U.S. most cultural diplomats and academic scholars 
have advocated an increase in America’s soft power; most importantly, cultural 
diplomacy, in the Middle East and North Africa. They have suggested balancing power 
strategies, a blend of hard with soft power, in international relations. However, this 
concept of smart power has not been fully integrated into U.S. foreign policy.  
     The different outcomes of U.S. cultural diplomacy, initiated by the Department of 
State prompt a series of reflections. What were the main determinants of successful 
cultural diplomacy during the Cold War? Did the U.S. Department of State use a distinct 
soft power resource in cultural exchanges during the Cold War? If so, what type of 
effective diplomatic tools did the Department of State use in order to ameliorate U.S.-
Soviet relations? President Eisenhower’s Emergency Fund for International Affairs that 
supported the nation’s first cultural export program of dance will provide an insight to 
test my hypothesis that argues in favor of bringing cooperation between nation-states, and 
reducing tension between states; particularly, through dance. This case study will also 
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show whether Raqs Sharqi, an Egyptian folk dance, might be an effective diplomatic tool 
in U.S.-Egypt relations. 
     To verify the accuracy of my hypothesis, I will measure two variables: the degree of 
success achieved by dance in cultural diplomacy during the Cold War, and the degree of 
support for Raqs Sharqi in U.S.-Egypt relations. If my research question proves correct, a 
cultural diplomacy program, combined with dance in U.S.-Egypt relations, should 
determine Raqs Sharqi as an effective diplomatic tool. In this case, the term “success” 
pertains to cultural dialogue and exchange of cultural ideas between the West and the 
Middle East that deliver an effective message of mutual understanding. In fact, it does not 
entail a panacea to U.S.-Middle East relations, including U.S.-Egypt relations. It is 
important to note that in the Cold War case studies of cultural diplomacy, the alleged 
“success” of dancers as cultural diplomats is determined by more than two aspects: 
bringing the cooperation between nation-states, reducing tension between states, and 
breaking down ideologies. 
The Degree of Success From Dance in Cultural Diplomacy During the Cold War 
    President Eisenhower authorized the Emergency Fund for International Affairs in 
1954. Eisenhower saw the performing arts, including dance as a magnitude of culture, as 
an indispensible diplomatic tool in the formation of peace. At that time, unlike today the 
U.S. Department of State allocated funding of $2,250,000 for the performing arts. It 
allowed for America’s top-notch dancers and their companies to present Western values 
of democracy, such as America’s freedom through various choreographies. While on 
tours, sponsored by the U.S. Department of State, dancers performed and met with people 
from other countries with similar or dissimilar cultures. Their goal was to collaborate and 
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learn from each other’s cultures through dance, which allowed for the formation of an 
amicable bond. In sum, Eisenhower’s Fund Program enhanced America’s image abroad 
tremendously.276 
      I will now assess if the role of dancers as cultural attachés contributed to the 
amelioration of U.S.-Soviet relations. As America’s image overseas plunged, and 
Americans were considered nothing but materialistic, boorish, uncultured, and superficial 
barbarians, the U.S. Department realized the necessity to dispel these negative notions of 
American culture. Performing artists’ diplomatic missions overseas served as an 
inexpensive way of proving these stereotypes wrong, and breaking down barriers. Martha 
Graham’s role as a cultural diplomat, whether in Japan, Indonesia, Pakistan or the Soviet 
Union, broke down these negative attitudes through dance. Many other dancers like 
Robert Joffrey, Alvin Ailey, and Jose Limón followed suit, and helped save America’s 
anti-image abroad. U.S. embassies all around the world received telegrams 
acknowledging the success of these cultural exchange activities through dance. What’s 
more, dancers, who served as cultural diplomats brought dialogue between states and 
released tension between nations, while representing the U.S. As a result, the U.S. 
Department of State repeatedly sponsored the performing arts in cultural diplomacy, 
unlike today’s minimal funds allocated for artists to represent America overseas.  
     With regards to the effectiveness of dance in cultural diplomacy as a diplomatic tool, 
this thesis has repeatedly stressed the importance of soft power to demonstrate that 
dissimilar cultures do not clash but interact and enrich each other. It was the power of 
music and dance, best represented by America’s finest caliber of dance artists that united 
cultures. Accordingly, dance was used as a weapon during the Cold War, instead of atom !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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bombs that the U.S. was notorious for overseas. The U.S. considered dance as a tool to 
export American values of democracy and freedom overseas to counteract Soviet 
communism. Dance became the most exported cultural commodity. Hence, America’s 
dancers became the country’s goodwill ambassadors. While interacting with citizens 
from host countries, dancers captured the admiration of government officials, diplomats, 
ambassadors, and industrial leaders. Dance artists accomplished what many U.S. 
government officials have attempted to do for many years—to spread a message of 
mutual understanding among nations. These prime examples eloquently elucidate the 
success of cultural diplomacy as a soft power resource. For these reasons, “success” 
implies dance being an effective diplomatic tool in international relations.  
    Although arguing that dance in cultural diplomacy served as a catalyst between nations 
as in the case of U.S.-Soviet relations, it is important to note that dance was not the sole 
entity that contributed to the success of cultural diplomacy. To illustrate, a variety of 
performing artists such as jazz and philharmonic musicians, served as cultural diplomats 
during the Cold War. Duke Ellington and Dizzy Gillespie were some of the African-
American jazz musicians that represented the U.S. abroad. These examples elucidate the 
plethora of cultural resources that can be expressed through cultural diplomacy. 
      Although analyzing speculations about performing artists in cultural diplomacy is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, it is useful to contextualize what aspects of the 
performing arts were considered by some sa U.S. government propaganda. As indicated 
in some of the chapters, Martha Graham, Alvin Ailey, and others often shared their 
individual and artistic ideas with the citizens of other countries, instead of lecturing 
foreign audiences about U.S. politics. Although racial segregation in the U.S. was a 
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common scenario during the Cold War, dance artists like Martha Graham and others 
toured countries with a multi-racial cast of dancers that truly and vividly portrayed the 
diversity of U.S. culture. American dance artists “communicated above all through their 
concern with sound, image, shape, energy, conveying a personal vision derived from their 
imagination, heritage, and training. It was this vision that was so powerful. It was not 
their intent to talk or preach about the greatness of America.”277 
     Similarly, many sceptics thought of jazz in cultural diplomacy during the Cold War to 
be nothing but more but propaganda, sponsored by the U.S. Department of State. Yet, 
African-American jazz musicians agreed to tour as cultural attachés, despite their notions 
of being racially segregated in their home country. Accordingly, as cultural diplomacy is 
designed to shatter stereotypes, when touring countries, African-American jazz musicians 
embraced the opportunity to express the magnitude of inequalities among people of color 
in the U.S.A. Therefore, Duke Ellington and Dizzy Gillespie used jazz music as a 
diplomatic tool to transcend the denial of their civic rights back home. Both African-
American musicians and American dancers “insisted on performing” for the everyday 
people, and not just the elites.”278 These examples illuminate the fact that neither dancers 
nor musicians in cultural diplomacy were a part of U.S. government propaganda. On the 
contrary, they only reiterate one of the many positive outcomes of cultural diplomacy. 
That is to say, the performing arts have the power to break political barriers and 
strengthen ties between nations, even under critical circumstances. 
     These case studies shed light on the unrealized potential of cultural diplomacy that 
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contributes to an increased understanding among nations, which may lead to positive 
results in the way governments behave.  
The Degree of Support for Raqs Sharqi in U.S.-Egypt Relations. 
In order to contextualize the degree of support for Raqs Sharqi, it is useful to clarify that 
support for this folk dance refers to support from both the U.S. government and Egyptian 
government as a diplomatic tool in cultural diplomacy. As has been noted, cultural 
diplomacy takes place not only in the context of diplomatic relations between nations, but 
also within the domestic peripheries of a country. For example, Raqs Sharqi has received 
much support from both dance and non-dance communities around the world to bring an 
awareness for cultural dialogue and exchange for cultural ideas through this folk dance. 
As demonstrated in chapter VI, dance communities around the globe have created various 
dance festivals, workshops, seminars, conferences, and organizations that cater to 
teaching and performing Raqs Sharqi. In addition to being a folk dance, Raqs Sharqi 
celebrates the joy and happiness of life as practiced by the people of the Middle East and 
North Africa.  
    If Raqs Sharqi is a folk dance that represents the values and traditions of Arabic 
culture, then why has it not been sponsored by the U.S. Department of State in its dance 
diplomacy programs? In order to assess the degree of support for Raqs Sharqi under the 
U.S. Department of State, it is important to consider several aspects. First, as stated in the 
previous chapters cultural diplomacy activities, sponsored by the U.S. Department of 
State have suffered severe cutbacks. Unlike the Cold War, when cultural diplomacy was 
fully funded, therefore, at its best, today the Department of State has ignored the potential 
of cultural diplomacy. Instead the Department of State has chosen to invest more in hard 
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power. What’s more, funds for tours of performing artists overseas have decreased since 
the end of the Cold War. To reiterate, at the end of a war, the Department of State quickly 
dismissed the importance of cultural diplomacy. Therefore, it reduced the funds for 
cultural exchanges.  
     Second, today the U.S. Department of State has limited the opportunities for cultural 
diplomacy to the Middle East and North Africa. Although these geographical regions 
have been geopolitical and strategic for the Department of State for many years now, 
especially in U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. government has departed from providing 
sufficient funds for cultural diplomacy in the Middle East, let alone, in U.S.-Egypt 
relations. Accordingly, few American dance companies have been sent overseas as 
cultural diplomats for short periods of time, because of lack of funds for the performing 
arts. To illustrate, the Battery Dance Company, the Trey McIntyre Project, the Sean 
Curran Company, the Jazz Tap Ensemble, and Rennie Harris Puremovement all have 
received funds from the U.S. Department of State to go on a tour to represent U.S. culture 
overseas. It is important to note that all of these dance companies are limited to only 
representing American dance, hence, American culture. 
     Third, the U.S. government has opted out from incorporating indigenous dances of the 
Arab world such as Raqs Sharqi into its dance diplomacy programs. The U.S. Department 
has sponsored tours of American dance companies that perform ballet, but as an art form 
ballet does not represent American culture. Instead, ballet was developed by the 
Russians, that is why, they are the pioneers of ballet. The Department of State continues 
to send the American Ballet Theatre (ABT) to perform in Russia as part of its cultural 
diplomacy activities. To illustrate, in March 2011, the Department of State sponsored the 
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ABT to perform at the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow. 279 During the Cold War, the Dance 
Panel Committee approved several American ballet companies, therefore, the U.S. 
Department of State sponsored them to represent the U.S. in the Soviet Union. Equally 
important, none of the ballet dancers in America, sponsored by the Department of State 
during the Cold War were native Russians. As demonstrated in the earlier chapters, 
American ballet dance companies captured Soviet audiences, and made positive 
impressions among everyday people and government officials. 280 By doing so, the U.S. 
Department of State demonstrated that it both understands and appreciates Soviet culture. 
In reciprocity, the Soviet Union sent on a U.S. tour its finest ballet dance companies, such 
as the Bolshoi Ballet or Igor Moiseyev’s Ballet Company. What’s more, these 
reciprocities illuminate the fact that no matter how different, cultures can interact. 
     Fourth, as reiterated in chapter VI the Egyptian government has sponsored some of its 
finest folk dance troupes, including the Mahmoud Reda Troupe and the El-Nil [The Nile] 
Folkloric Troupe. The Mahmoud Reda Troupe was well-known for the inclusion of Raqs 
Sharqi in its repertoire. As the group toured in several countries around the world, 
including the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the Egyptian Ministry of Culture hired Soviet 
ballet experts to train Reda’s dancers. In other words, to ensure that Mahmoud Reda, the 
owner of the dance company, will not incorporate any body movements that might be 
considered risqué in his choreographies. Therefore, substituting these movements with 
balletic movements. As stated earlier, Raqs Sharqi has suffered ongoing negative 
attitudes from the Egyptian elite that stem from Ottoman and British colonialism. When 
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discussing the elite, it is imperative to note that it refers to the Egyptian government, 
most importantly, the Egyptian Ministry of Culture. Thus, Raqs Sharqi is still mistakenly 
thought of being nothing but striptease because of Western misinterpretations, and 
because some of its movements are misinterpreted as sexual, especially, when the 
abdominal muscles are exposed in a two-piece costume. In addition, this attached stigma 
has driven Islamic fundamentalists in Egypt to prevent Raqs Sharqi from being 
performed in public, namely by threatening the dancers. Of utmost importance is the fact 
that unlike other Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran or Afghanistan, where dance in 
public has been banned, in Egypt dancing in public, including Raqs Sharqi, still exists, 
professionally and when performed in private settings. Finally, because of ongoing 
colonial attitudes, Islamic fundamentalism, and that Raqs Sharqi is often mistakenly 
associated with sexuality, the Egyptian government has not expressed an interest in 
sponsoring Egyptian folk dance companies that present Raqs Sharqi. 
     Similarly, during the Cold War both the U.S. public and the members of the Dance 
Panel often criticized Martha Graham and Katherine Dunham for including themes of 
sexuality in their choreographies.281 In like manner, in the first place the Dance Panel 
refused to approve other dancers like Pearl Primus because it saw her work as too 
avantgarde and controversial, therefore, too risky. 282 Despite these negative attitudes and 
harsh criticism towards dance, the Dance Panel managed to look beyond these limiting 
stereotypes and approved both Graham and Dunham’s dance companies. Consequently, 
the Dance Panel recommended them to the Department of State and sent them on tours 
overseas. Although the Dance Panel criticized their work as overtly sexual, both Graham !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and Dunham’s tours were a smashing success. As a result, the role of these American 
dance artists as cultural diplomats strengthened the bond that unites America with other 
nations. Their dance companies contributed to the development of fruitful, friendly, and 
peaceful relations between the U.S. and other countries.283  
      It could also be argued that the U.S. Department of State has refused to sponsor Raqs 
Sharqi in cultural diplomacy in U.S.-Egypt relations because of two reasons. First, 
because in the West, Raqs Sharqi has been Westernized and misinterpreted as sexual, 
namely, the term belly dance. The Department of State along with U.S. public opinion 
might have assumed that Raqs Sharqi is too risky or controversial. Also, the Department 
of State might mistakenly assume that Raqs Sharqi is overtly sexual without being 
familiar with its true origins because of negative attitudes that stem from the Mid-
Victorian Era. In other words, the U.S. Department of State might fear that sending Raqs 
Sharqi choreographers to Egypt as cultural ambassadors would elicit a negative response 
among the elite, the conservatives, and the Islamic fundamentalists in Egypt. If fully 
funded by the public and private sector, and integrated into cultural diplomacy, Raqs 
Sharqi might be able to elucidate to the world that dissimilar cultures like Western and 
Islamic culture do not clash but interact. Above all, it is suggested that the U.S. and Egypt 
facilitate these interactions. 
Interviews 
     In order to elucidate the importance of Raqs Sharqi as a diplomatic tool, a survey with 
several questions was conducted with professional Raqs Sharqi dancers from the U.S. 
There were a total of six participants: male and female, both dance instructors and 
performers. The age range was 28-70. Some of the dancers had higher education, such as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
283 Ibid., 127. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Torkom Movsesiyan 
! *+*!
a Bachelor or Master degree, while others had only a high school diploma. Four out of six 
dancers had at least eight years of both teaching and performing Raqs Sharqi in the U.S., 
Egypt, and many other countries, where there has been a niche for Raqs Sharqi 
communities. 
     All six participants were asked if cultural diplomacy will play a significant role in 
U.S.-Egypt relations or in U.S.-Middle East relations in the near future. Five out of six 
participants responded that given the current political discourse of the Middle East and 
North Africa, cultural diplomacy most likely will not play any role in U.S.-Egypt or U.S.-
Middle East relations. Only four of the participants had performed in Egypt during the 
Ahlan wa Sahlan festival and other public or private events in Alexandria and Egypt. 
When asked what type of audience did they perform for in Egypt, all four indicated that 
the audience consisted mostly of dancers, both Egyptians and non-Egyptians. Also, they 
explained that the audience was a mixture of native Egyptians, tourists, fellow Raqs 
Sharqi dancers from various parts of the world, but minimal if any religious observants. 
All four participants responded that the audience was extremely receptive and 
enthusiastic to their performances.  
    All six participants noted that they performed and taught Raqs Sharqi at various public 
venues in several states in America. Their audience members consisted of conservatives, 
artists, dancers, politicians, students, diplomats, restaurant and club patrons, and patients 
from hospitals and nursing homes. Their response to the reaction of the audience in the 
U.S. was mostly positive; however, there was some criticism from conservatives. One of 
the survey participants was a temporary visitor to the U.S., originally from Panama, who 
both teaches and performs Raqs Sharqi. Although she admitted that she had never 
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performed in Egypt or its surrounding countries, this woman noted that she performed in 
front of native Egyptians, who happened to be critical of her performance. However, 
although not a native Egyptian, the same female dancer from Panama has been invited by 
Egyptian government officials to perform at the Egyptian Embassy in Panama on a 
regular basis as part of representing Egyptian culture. What’s more, this dancer explained 
that the Egyptian Embassy staff members always enjoy her Raqs Sharqi performance.  
     When asked why only hegemonic dance forms like ballet have been sponsored as 
cultural exchanges by the U.S. Department of State, all six participants answered that 
because of the Western misinterpretation of Raqs Sharqi, sometimes referred to as belly 
dance, Raqs Sharqi is often considered sexual or embarassaing. Therefore, this dance is 
not seen as legitimate by conservatives or the elite. One of the participants is a male 
performer from the U.S., who added that if the U.S. Department sponsored Raqs Sharqi 
as a diplomatic tool in U.S.-Middle East relations, the Islamic fundamentalists in the 
Arab world would be upset. Equally important, he noted that first and foremost, the U.S. 
government should increase its budgets for the performing arts in cultural diplomacy, 
instead of allocating big chunks of funding for hard power resources, such as war. When 
asked the same question, another participant, who teaches and performs a Levantine folk 
dance, known as dabke, in New York City, reiterated that she sees the problem in the fact 
that first, the U.S. Department does not support the arts in general. Second, she added that 
unlike other states, the U.S. lacks a ministry of culture. 
     When asked if the U.S. Department of State should invite native Egyptian dance 
artists to teach and perform Raqs Sharqi or other indigenous dance forms, all six 
participants responded affirmatively, emphasizing that doing so would be great for the 
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U.S to learn about Egyptian culture through Raqs Sharqi. In reciprocity, when asked if 
the Department of State should sponsor American dancers to perform Raqs Sharqi in 
Egypt, all six participants responded that it would be great. 
     All six participants mentioned that the U.S. Department of State does not invest 
enough in cultural diplomacy in U.S.-Middle East relations. In addition, one of the 
female participants added that the Department of State is not interested in doing so 
because cultural diplomacy does not serve its current purpose, that is to say, hard power, 
such as war. Also, the participant reported that in terms of cultural understanding, the 
U.S. Department of State does not want people to understand and appreciate each other. 
In like manner, two out of six participants thought that even if the Department of State 
sponsors American dancers for tours in the Middle East, it would be American dancers, 
who only perform American dance. Therefore, this excludes American dancers who teach 
and perform Raqs Sharqi. 
     It is of utmost importance to mention that if it had not been for the development of 
Raqs Sharqi in North America, namely, the U.S. and Canada, this valuable folk dance 
would have died out. Because of negative attitudes from the elite and Islamic 
fundamentalism towards this dance, Raqs Sharqi dancers in the West should be given 
credit for building strong communities, creating dance festivals, and curriculums to teach 
this folk dance. In other words, gratitude should be given to all Raqs Sharqi perfomers in 
the West and other parts of the world for preserving this dance because it has been 
exposed to extinction. The list of Raqs Sharqi experts in the West extends to Morocco, 
Tarik Sultan, Anahid Sofian, A’isha Azar, Serena, Ibrahim Farrah, Nourhan Sharif, 
Jamila Salimpour, and many others. In reciprocity, in Egypt credit should be given for 
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Raqia Hassan, Fifi Abdou, Farida Fahmy, Mahmoud Reda, Fifi Abdou, Dina, Dandesh, 
Tito, and many others. 
Final Implications 
     As has been noted, this discussion illustrates both variables: the degree of success 
from dance in cultural diplomacy during the Cold War, and the degree of support for 
Raqs Sharqi in U.S.-Egypt relations, as seen by the U.S. and Egyptian government. Both 
negative attitudes and Islamic fundamentalism have shaped the ideologies of the U.S. and 
the Egyptian government in one direction: to hinder the potential of Raqs Sharqi as an 
effective diplomatic tool in cultural diplomacy. Nevertheless, a distinction should be 
made when referring to the degree of threat that Islamic fundamentalism projects on Raqs 
Sharqi. This thesis does not imply that as a diplomatic tool in U.S.-Egypt relations Raqs 
Sharqi should target Islamic fundamentalist audiences. On the contrary, as a diplomatic 
tool, Raqs Sharqi should reach out to everyday audiences and the elite. 
     The establishment of these obstacles indicate that the level of intolerance towards 
Raqs Sharqi in cultural diplomacy had reached its peak. This conundrum, thus, proves 
how a substantial absence of Raqs Sharqi support has been one of the factors that both 
governments have opted out from including it in cultural diplomacy. For my initial 
hypothesis to be correct, a high level of ideological adaptability coupled with minimal 
funds for dance in cultural diplomacy should affect the inclusion of Raqs Sharqi in U.S.-
Egypt relations, which in turn, may negatively impact the success of and support for Raqs 
Sharqi in U.S.-Egypt relations.  
     Notwithstanding, there is a strong correlation between the rationales of both 
governments—U.S. and Egypt, not to support Raqs Sharqi in cultural diplomacy. For 
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these reasons, both the U.S. and the Egyptian government have neglected the unrealized 
potential of Raqs Sharqi in U.S.-Egypt relations. Furthermore, one can draw an analogy 
between the rationale of the Dance Panel committee to initially reject the dances of 
Martha Graham and Katherine Dunham because of being sexual during the Cold War, 
and the rationale behind the U.S. and Egyptian government, where the elite sees Raqs 
Sharqi as sexual. Therefore, there is a strong correlation between both rationales that 
revolve around the idea of assuming that some dance forms, such as Raqs Sharqi contain 
overt sexuality. It is important to note that this analogy does not imply that Raqs Sharqi 
or Graham’s dances are sexual by nature. Despite the above analogy, Martha Graham and 
Katherine Dunham’s dances of being associated with overt sexuality were approved by 
the members of the Dance Panel. Above all, the success of Martha Graham’s dance tours 
overseas shows that the threshold of support for Raqs Sharqi and its success in U.S.-
Egypt relations is yet to be met. 
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                                                   CHAPTER VIII 
                                                  CONCLUSION 
 
Lessons learned 
      In final analysis, neither the U.S. Department of State nor the Egyptian Ministry of 
Culture needs another Cold War to support the performing arts in cultural diplomacy. 
What’s more, the efficiency of dance as a diplomatic tool in international affairs today is 
the same as that of the Cold War. This scholarship has demonstrated the unrealized 
potential of cultural diplomacy in U.S.-Egypt relations, and its pivotal role as a 
diplomatic tool in international affairs. Because of America’s declining image in the 
Middle East and North Africa after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, there has been a 
necessity for softening hegemonic hard power. Furthermore, following the fall of 
Mubarak’s regime and the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, the U.S. Department of State 
has been uncertain about the future of its alliance with Egypt. Namely, Muslim 
Brotherhood-nurtured Egyptian President, Mohammed Morsi. Likewise, a unisex folk 
dance, known as Raqs Sharqi, has demonstrated its efficiency as an indispensable tool, 
yet, prejudice by the U.S. and Egyptian governments has hindered its potential in global 
affairs. 
     Equally important, this thesis has illuminated the level of Egyptian and U.S. 
government support for dance as a soft power resource to be minimal and insufficient. 
The stark cutbacks in cultural diplomacy budgets by the U.S. Department of State, 
beginning in the 1990s, hindered the magnitude of culture as a powerful weapon. The 
miniscule budget, allocated for cultural diplomacy has prevented the exposure of 
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American culture to the Islamic world. As has been noted, cultural diplomacy has gained 
popularity in international relations, but it still remains a neglected diplomatic tool in 
U.S.-Middle East relations.  
     In addition, this thesis has illustrated that Raqs Sharqi is exposed to extinction, 
because the Egyptian Ministry of Culture has chosen to opt out from fully appreciating 
and substantially funding the arts. Although there is a platform for Egyptian dance artists 
to preserve Raqs Sharqi and other indigenous dances, the Egyptian government has 
chosen to exclude Egyptian dance as an exported cultural commodity. While the diversity 
of folk dances in Egypt is illustrated here as abundant, it is unfortunate that the Egyptian 
Ministry of Culture still neglects one of its most valuable treasures: Raqs Sharqi, an 
ancient dance that dates back to pre-historical times.  
     Exporting Raqs Sharqi to Egypt might help America boost its shrinking image in the 
Arab world. The fact that the U.S. is obsessed with the Middle East because of its 
geopolitics is not a reason to neglect cultural exchange activities. Nevertheless, the rise of 
anti-Americanism in the Middle East is of high concern, especially for future generations 
to deal with. This thesis has shown that favorable public opinion of the U.S. overseas has 
plummeted, particularly, disagreements with U.S. foreign policy, which hinders 
America’s soft power. However, the more the U.S. government continues to neglect its 
soft power, the harder it will be in the long run. That is why, the more enhanced 
America’s soft power is, the stronger the legitimacy of its foreign policy will be in the 
eyes of others.  
     As reiterated, cultural diplomacy is not a panacea to U.S.-Middle East relations. On 
the contrary, as illustrated in the case studies of the Cold War, the performing arts 
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became America’s most exported cultural commodities, but with the end of the Cold 
War, funds for cultural diplomacy are slashed. This is probably as a result of America’s 
traditional lack of public support for the arts. Yet, once America is at war, the popularity 
of cultural diplomacy gradually increases. Although cultural diplomacy requires less 
funds than a military might, it involves a generational commitment.  
     Supporting cultural diplomacy as a diplomatic tool in international relations, brings 
positive outcomes that benefit both the host and the targeted country in the long run. To 
illustrate, cultural diplomacy fosters cultural understanding, and spreads an effective 
message of understanding between states. Of utmost importance is the magnitude of 
cultural diplomacy to attract, therefore, to influence political leaders of nations, unlike a 
hegemonic hard power approach. Cultural diplomacy also counteracts terrorism, hatred, 
misunderstanding, gaffes and missteps.  
     Accordingly, as seen in case studies of dance in cultural diplomacy during the Cold 
War, dance artists, who served as cultural ambassadors, accomplished what traditional 
embassy staff members have attempted to do for decades. For example, through the 
spectrum of dance, performing artists broke down clichés, dispelled notions of American 
culture, released tension between nations, and brought peace. Similarly, Raqs Sharqi has 
demonstrated the spread of joy and happiness of life that can counterbalance 
misunderstanding between the West and the Islamic world, specifically, U.S. prejudices 
that Islamic culture is backward, bloodthirsty, and undemocratic. In reciprocity, 
projecting soft power through cultural diplomacy helps dispel political biases of the U.S. 
government being pro-Israeli. Hence, the Islamic world views lack of cultural diplomacy 
on behalf of the U.S. Department of State as “no cultural counterweight to our foreign 
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policy.”284 
Recommendations 
     The following compilation of recommendations, drawn from interviews, articles, 
books, discussions, conferences, and the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy 
(ACCD) reports, for the U.S. Department of State to consider, is divided into three 
sections. The first one pertains to the overall efficiency of cultural diplomacy, specifically 
in U.S.-Middle East and North African relations, addressed to the Secretary of State: 
• To increase the budget, allocated for cultural diplomacy in international relations. 
• To increase the staffing for cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy. 
• To implement courses on foreign culture, geography, foreign language and 
    literature, and world history in high schools and universities across the nation.  
    Priority should be given to the Middle East and North Africa as both strategic and  
    critical regions to the Department of State. 
• To invite Muslim and other countries’ most prominent artists, writers, scholars, and 
    similar cultural figures to share values, traditions, views, and sensitivities of those  
    cultures that enable people to prevent misunderstanding, hatred, and terrorism. 
• To encourage cultural diplomacy funds from both the public and the private 
    sector. 
• To increase funds for translations of literary, intellectual, philosophical, political, 
    and other works from English into Arabic, and other foreign languages, and vice  
   versa.  
• To expand both cultural and library centers at U.S. embassies and consulates 
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    around the globe, namely, the Middle East and North Africa. 
•  To ease the visa issuing process, especially for international students or exchange 
     visitors from the Middle East and North Africa, holding either F or J visas. 
•  To expand cultural exchange programs, such as study abroad programs, especially 
in the Islamic world. 
•  To encourage U.S. cultural organizations to sponsor internships or fellowships for 
    international students, with a priority given to students from the Muslim world. 
• To encourage U.S. television, radio, and online broadcastings to export 
   documentaries that best represent U.S. culture to the Arab world. In reciprocity, to      
   encourage the import of foreign language films that best describe different aspects   
   of foreign culture.  
• To organize professional development workshops about cultural diplomacy in 
    which U.S. government officials can learn about the importance of cultural 
    exchange programs.  
• To encourage U.S. museums to sponsor exhibits of Middle Eastern artworks and 
    artifacts, and export their American counterparts to museums overseas. 
• To advocate for the inclusion of medical outreach into cultural diplomacy, 
    orchestrating visits to the homelands of foreign-born health care professionals, who  
    practice how to train physicians and help patients in the U.S.  
• To bring Islamic imams to churches, cathedrals, and synagogues in the U.S. to 
    educate American religious authorities about the values of Islam, and vice versa. 
The following recommendations related to the performing arts in cultural diplomacy, 
specifically Raqs Sharqi in U.S.-Middle East and North African relations urge the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Torkom Movsesiyan 
! ***!
Secretary of State: 
• To increase funds for the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (BECA), 
where priority is given to the performing arts. 
• To increase the staffing of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. 
• To increase the funds, allocated for tours of the DanceMotion USA, and to increase 
    the number of American dancers, who serve as cultural diplomats overseas,  
    namely, in the Middle East and North Africa. 
• To support the inclusion of Raqs Sharqi in BECA’s dance diplomacy tours to the 
    Middle East, most importantly, Egypt. 
• To work closely with the Ministry of Culture in Egypt by encouraging tours of the 
    performing arts in cultural diplomacy, specifically Raqs Sharqi. 
• To invite performing artists, including troupes, ensembles, and solo performers 
    from the Middle East and North Africa to the U.S.A. 
• To invite Raqs Sharqi dancers and instructors from Egypt to the U.S., and other  
    folk dance performers, troupes or ensembles from other Muslim countries to share  
    their cultures through dance. 
• To support U.S. cultural institutions, not-for-profits, and dance academies that 
    promote Raqs Sharqi and other folk dances of the Middle East and North Africa. 
• To help raise funds for Raqs Sharqi and other folk dance related activities, such as 
    dance festivals, workshops, conferences, workshops, seminars, and symposiums,  
    from the public and private sector. 
• To implement curriculum for Raqs Sharqi courses in U.S. schools and universities. 
• To help raise funds for academic publications of books, journals, magazines, and 
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    articles that elucidate the historical background of Raqs Sharqi. 
• To encourage scholarships and fellowships for Raqs Sharqi and other folk dance 
    performers and instructors in the U.S. 
• To encourage U.S. television, radio, and online broadcastings to produce 
    documentaries that expose Americans to Raqs Sharqi. 
• To encourage the education of the Arabic language and its distinct dialects in study 
    abroad programs, high schools and universities. 
• To encourage U.S. libraries to promote scholarly sources about Raqs Sharqi and the 
    folk dances of the Middle East. 
The following recommendations pertain to Raqs Sharqi in cultural diplomacy, 
specifically in U.S.-Egypt relations urge the Egyptian Ministry of Culture: 
• To revisit its soft power resources from the Cold War, when Egyptian dance was 
prioritized in cultural diplomacy. 
• To sponsor tours of its folk dance troupes as a diplomatic tool in cultural 
    diplomacy. 
• To increase funds for schools, dance festivals, and cultural institutions that teach 
    and perform Raqs Sharqi. 
• To work closely with the U.S. Department of State to expose Egyptian students 
    to American culture through cultural exchanges in the U.S., such as study abroad  
    programs. 
• To work closely with the American University in Cairo and coordinate cultural 
    events that introduce American culture to Egyptian students. 
• To invite American dancers, who are experts of Raqs Sharqi to share their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Torkom Movsesiyan 
! **#!
    expertise with their Egyptian counterparts and collaborate. 
• To support the Ahlan wa Sahlan dance festival in Egypt and provide security to its 
    participants from possible attacks by the Islamist fundamentalists. 
• To encourage the inclusion of Raqs Shari in school curriculums, and the formation 
    of folk dance troupes by young men and women to preserve Egyptian culture. 
     Will scholars engage in research by developing case studies, and building academic 
courses that advance learning and address the needs of dance artists as cultural diplomats 
in cultural diplomacy? Will cultural diplomacy practitioners provide data useful to 
scholars and take advantage of relevant scholarship? Will scholars and cultural 
diplomacy practitioners use their knowledge to enrich learning and public debate? Will 
the U.S. Department of State realize the potential of cultural diplomacy, as it did during 
the Cold War or not? Will the U.S. Department of State continue to support the 
performing arts in cultural diplomacy, only when the nation is at war or permanently in 
the long run?  
     Will both the U.S and the Egyptian government make the effort to look beyond the 
limiting stereotypes of Raqs Sharqi as overtly sexual fearing that it might elicit a negative 
response? Will the Egyptian government encourage the public support of the performing 
artists, namely its folk dances, as an amplitude of Egyptian culture or not? Will the 
Egyptian government continue to consider its traditional dances as backward? Will the 
Department of State enhance its soft power resources or it will rely on its traditional 
hegemonic hard power resources in U.S.-Middle East relations? Will U.S. foreign policy 
continue to hinder American culture or not? If we achieve positive answers to these and 
other questions, the rewards can be significant for academic study and the practice of 
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cultural diplomacy. 
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                                                                   Appendix 
Survey questionnaire 
1. What is your age? 
2. What is your sex? 
3. What is your occupation? 
4. What is your level of education? 
5. What is your level of expertise on Raqs Sharqi? 
6. Do you teach Raqs Sharqi? 
7. Do you perform Raqs Sharqi? 
8. How many years have you been performing Raqs Sharqi? 
9. How many years have you been teaching Raqs Sharqi? 
10. Besides Raqs Sharqi, do you perform or teach any other indigenous or folk dances of   
the Middle East and North Africa? If so, please specify. 
11. Have you ever performed or taught Raqs Sharqi in Egypt? 
12. Have you ever performed or taught Raqs Sharqi in any other Middle Eastern or North 
African country? 
13. If performed or taught Raqs Sharqi in Egypt or elsewhere, what was the reaction of 
the audience during your performance or dance class? 
14. If performed or taught Raqs Sharqi in Egypt or elsewhere what was the type of 
audience you interacted with? For example, dancers, tourists, politicians, government 
officials, religious authorities, elite, etc.? 
15. Why only hegemonic dance forms like ballet have been sponsored as cultural 
exchanges by the U.S. Department of State? 
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16. Will cultural diplomacy play a significant role in U.S.-Egypt relations or in U.S.-
Middle East relations in the near future? 
17. Should the U.S. Department of State invite native Egyptian dance artists to teach and 
perform Raqs Sharqi or other indigenous dance forms in the U.S.? 
18. Should the Department of State sponsor American dancers to perform or teach Raqs 
Sharqi in Egypt? 
Your participation in this survey is highly appreciated, and your personal 
information will be kept as strictly confidential. Thank you kindly! 
 
 
